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Map 2. Approximate areas of influence of main armed groups active in the eastern DRC, 
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Preface: The Usalama Project
The Rift Valley Institute’s Usalama Project (‘peace’ or ‘security’ in Swahili) 
is a response to on-going violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). The protracted suffering of the inhabitants of this region in 
the past two decades has resulted in the expenditure of billions of dollars on 
conflict resolution. Yet the Congolese armed groups at the heart of the conflict 
are still poorly understood by the international organizations that operate in 
the Congo—and even by the Kinshasa government itself. The Usalama Project 
examines the roots of violence, with the aim of providing a better under-
standing of all armed groups, including the national army, the Forces armées de 
la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo).
The Usalama research programme is guided by a series of questions. What 
is the history of these armed groups? Who supports and controls them? What 
are the relations of particular groups to the state, to neighbouring states, to 
business interests and to the Congolese armed forces? Why have some groups 
been so difficult to demobilize, while others have disappeared? And are there 
patterns to be discerned in the ways that groups proliferate, negotiate with the 
state, and then vanish again?
The project takes a primarily qualitative approach. It analyses historical 
sources and the small amount of quantitative data available, and traces the 
origins of armed groups through interviews with politicians, businessmen, 
representatives of civil society, and members of armed groups. The Project 
involves extended fieldwork by both international and Congolese researchers. 
The outcomes include reports on specific armed groups and wider geographical 
areas of conflict, and a series of seminars and workshops in the Congo.
Many of the interviews for this report were conducted on condition of 
anonymity. Where confidentiality was requested, identifying information in 
the report is limited to a number with a location and a date, e.g. Usalama 
Project Interviewee #105, Goma, 28 August 2012. In the course of the research, 
accounts of significant and potentially disputed events were confirmed by 
multiple sources with first-hand knowledge of the events under discussion.
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The eastern Congo has been a theatre of violent conflict for over two 
decades. The main source of violence is fighting among the Congolese 
army and an array of armed groups. Several dozen factions—ranging from 
disorganized village militias to professional rebel organizations—clash 
with each other and the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
Over the past eighteen months, the Rift Valley Institute’s Usalama 
Project has carried out investigations into seven of the most impor-
tant armed groups, and the Congolese army, in order to understand 
what drives them and whether policy responses have been adequate. 
This report presents the conclusions of that research in three parts: an 
analysis of armed mobilization, focusing on the region of North and 
South Kivu; an examination of the FARDC; and a critical review of past 
and current efforts in the field of demobilization and army reform.
While the social underpinnings of each armed group vary consider-
ably, since the beginning of the First Congo War (1996–7), armed actors 
have moved away from their roots in local communities to become more 
dependent on political and business elites in the region. However, even 
groups that form part of elite networks continue to be anchored in their 
local environment. While they may emerge as a result of competition over 
power between and among elites, they are at the same time informed by 
local conflicts and grievances. 
In the DRC’s current political order, violence is an effective strategy to 
obtain power and control resources. The resulting militarized nature of 
power politics is an outcome of the 2003–6 transition, which followed the 
end of the Second Congo War (1998–2003). The peace process was based 
on a power-sharing principle: former belligerents joined Congolese state 
structures and their armed wings were integrated into a new national 
army. The implied logic of this process—granting insurgents political 
power in order to quell their insurgencies—persists until today, creating 
incentives for elites to mobilize armed groups. 
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Troubled army policies constitute another source of armed mobili-
zation. By repeatedly integrating armed groups into the FARDC, the 
government has not only provided incentives for further insurrection, 
it has effectively sanctioned impunity. In turn, abuses committed by 
the army have driven numerous groups to take up arms and legitimized 
rebels’ claims of self-defence. Furthermore, the army is sometimes 
complicit in armed group mobilization, with officers providing support 
to armed groups or being involved in the arms trade.
Untangling this Gordian knot will require a comprehensive political 
and military strategy, aligning local, national, and international initia-
tives. This strategy will have to address both the incentives that drive 
elites to take up arms, and local conflicts over land and local governance 
that are liable to feature an ethnic dimension. An informed approach 
to such a complex problem thus needs to take a range of factors into 
account. Discussion with Congolese actors, both military and civilian, 
with local observers and with international specialists suggests that the 
following are the most important considerations.
Abandoning technocratic approaches. 
The donor approach to armed mobilization in the eastern DRC has 
been guided by a stabilization policy that is essentially a technocratic 
interpretation of violence as a law-and-order problem linked to weak 
state institutions. In order to tackle the political drivers of armed group 
activity this approach will have to be abandoned. A change in orientation 
will require closer coordination between donors, in particular for moving 
forward in politically sensitive areas such as army reform. 
Dealing with armed groups.
The Congolese government’s policies vis-à-vis armed groups have been 
erratic, rarely using political and military instruments in a coordinated 
manner. The government and its international partners should priori-
tize the groups that pose the greater risk of widespread destabilization, 
especially the M23 and FDLR. This will require negotiations with 
the Rwandan government. Dealing with the M23 and FDLR first will 
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make the process of engaging with other insurgencies—many of which 
either derive a part of their strength from one of these factions, or have 
mobilized against them—more straightforward.
Tackling violent competition among elites. 
In order to tackle violent competition between rival elites, the Congolese 
government will have to impose effective sanctions on their support 
networks. This will include the politicians and army commanders who 
are often key figures in these networks. The government should also 
aim to undercut the resource bases of armed groups by improving the 
formalization and regulation of trade and the natural resources sector. 
This will require assistance from international partners. Looking across 
the DRC’s eastern borders, there is an opportunity to transform violent 
competition involving elites in neighbouring countries into regional 
economic collaboration.
Managing military integration. 
The process of integration of armed groups (often led by army deserters) 
into the armed forces has become, paradoxically, an important incentive 
for armed mobilization. This integration policy should be progressively 
phased out and replaced by a demobilization programmes and systematic, 
targeted sanctions for rebel leaders. The FARDC should avoid creating 
homogenous units out of former rebels who have been integrated. They 
should be retrained and redeployed, while due attention should be given 
to merit in promotions. 
Reducing land conflicts.
Land reform is critical for the long-term stability of the eastern DRC. 
This will necessitate a reform of how land is governed, including legal 
reform and a process of local consultation. At the same time dispute 
resolution and arbitration mechanisms should also be strengthened and 
the scope of such mechanisms extended to the communal dimensions 
of land conflicts. 
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Improving local governance. 
Local elections, as stipulated by the constitution, could improve local 
governance and render customary chiefs more accountable. But for 
the electoral process to succeed communal tensions will need to be 
monitored before, during and after the elections, and local politicians 
who turn to ethnic mobilization will need to be subject to sanction. 
There is a role for international donors in funding a number of aspects 
of the electoral process: voter education, election monitoring by local 
civil society organization, and building the capacity of the newly elected 
local councillors.
Strengthening accountability and reconciliation. 
The issue of responsibility for past abuses remains to be addressed. 
The creation of mixed chambers for war crimes could be a start. The 
government should also foster reconciliation by sponsoring platforms for 
inter-community dialogue and civil society efforts in conflict mediation. 
And the authorities should ensure that hate speech and incitements to 
violence are prosecuted as crimes, under new legislation drafted for this 
purpose if necessary. Donors have a role to play: they should support 
local reconciliation efforts at the policy level and by funding.
Reforming the FARDC from the top. 
Reform of the army is critical to reducing violence in the eastern DRC. 
Previous efforts at army reform have failed to address the way that 
resources and power are distributed through patronage networks, as well 
as the impact of the manipulation of revenue generation on the army’s 
basic security functions. Oversight mechanisms need to be established, 
including parliamentary audits with investigatory powers, a stronger 
military court system, and a more transparent General Inspectorate of 
the Army. 
Reforming the FARDC from the bottom. 
While army reform should start at the top, to succeed it will have to 
lead to concrete improvements for lower-ranking soldiers: conditions of 
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service and the living conditions of soldiers and their families will need 
to be improved. The issue of relations between civilian and military 
should be addressed by institutional changes within the FARDC. These 
could include integrating civilian protection into operational planning, 
and the provision of support to local communities in their efforts to hold 
abusive army units to account. This will require substantial funds and 
comprehensive training programmes. 
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1. Introduction
The landscape of the eastern DRC is littered with dozens of foreign and 
Congolese armed groups of all shapes and sizes. The diversity within 
this multitude is remarkable: there are large-scale military movements 
with elaborate political structures; rebel groups without political wings; 
small-scale local defence and village militias; and factions that amount 
to little more than bandit gangs. Some of these groups have signifi-
cant military capabilities and political influence, and represent a direct 
threat to the government in Kinshasa. Others are confined to small, 
remote areas and are more troubling to the civilian population than to 
the government.
Armed groups are often characterised as thugs who prey on innocent 
and helpless civilians. Some are less predatory than others, however, 
and some enjoy considerable support from the local communities from 
which they are recruited. Urban-based provincial and national politicians 
and businessmen have, in some cases, a stronger influence on armed 
groups than the military leaders in the field, providing and organizing 
crucial financial, political, and logistical support. It is simplistic to think 
of armed groups as purely military organizations standing apart from 
society: they are embedded in civilian social networks, and inputs from 
elites and communities are often essential for their survival.
Aside from civilian networks, another crucial factor to understanding 
the kaleidoscope of armed groups in the eastern DRC is the national 
army, the FARDC. Many of its officers maintain close ties to non-state 
armed groups for political or commercial reasons. This undermines the 
army’s perceived neutrality, as do the on-going power struggles within 
the FARDC that often play out along ethnic lines. In a context of strong 
animosities between ethnically-identified groups, this lack of neutrality 
makes communities turn to armed groups for protection. This tendency 
is only reinforced by the army’s abusive behaviour.
Explaining armed group mobilization in the eastern DRC requires 
looking beyond the rebellions to the political, socio-economic, and 
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military contexts out of which these groups emerge, and to the histories 
that gave rise to them. The eastern DRC was not transformed into a 
fragmented theatre of combat overnight. Many of the factors that feed 
militarization in the Kivus can be traced back decades. This caveat also 
applies to the FARDC, whose dysfunctions are similarly rooted in the 
past. An account of this history is the first step in an analysis of the 
drivers of armed mobilization.
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2. The proliferation of armed groups  
in the eastern DRC
Histories of armed groups in the Kivus 
Most of the armed groups currently active in the eastern DRC are a direct 
product of the First (1996–7) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars and 
the subsequent transition period (2003–6) that led to the elections of 
2006. However, many of the groups that formed during those wars have 
their roots in previous eras. Prior to 1996, three broad periods of armed 
mobilization can be distinguished: the colonial period, when exactions by 
foreign invaders prompted resistance; the Simba rebellions in the 1960s, 
following on the heels of a chaotic independence and decentralization 
process; and the turbulent early 1990s, when a botched democratization 
attempt led to ethnic mobilization and violence.
The roots of today’s armed groups (1885–1965)
Armed mobilization in what is today the eastern DRC predates colonialism. 
The Arab-Swahili traders who controlled large parts of the east in the 
second half of the nineteenth century created quasi- professional militias 
in order to conduct slave raids, which prompted local resistance. The 
expansionist tendencies of Rwandan King Rwagubiri in the 1890s also 
provoked counter-mobilization, leading to the proliferation of militias 
linked to local communities. The late colonial period then saw forms of 
armed resistance that were local and millenarian in character, and usually 
directed against the colonial state and its predatory policies of taxation 
and forced labour. Examples of this are the 1931 Binji-Binji rebellion in 
South Kivu, the various Nyabingi revolts in Rutshuru (1910–30) and 
the 1944 Kitawala (Watchtower) uprising in Walikale, both territoires of 
North Kivu.
It was not until independence in 1960, however, that rebellion took 
place on a broad scale. The first years of the Congo’s independent 
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existence saw the emergence of stark political competition, provoked 
by rival ideologies and struggles over decentralization. The main fault 
lines pitted those advocating a strong centralized state, clustered around 
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, against federalists, represented by 
President Joseph Kasavubu. Over time, the unitarists became more 
outspokenly anti-imperialist, and federalists were perceived to be more 
leaning towards the Western powers.1
But this simple dichotomy conceals the fragmentation of politics after 
independence, with dozens of parties springing up in the newly-created 
political space, often with very local agendas and narrow ethnic constitu-
encies. The Kivus were no exception: in the chaos that engulfed the 
provinces between 1960–5, ethnic affiliations overlapped with or trumped 
political and other fault lines, a characteristic of Congolese politics that 
still obtains today.2
These overlapping fault lines were evident within the main rebellion 
that broke out in the Kivus after independence. In Uvira territoire in South 
Kivu, the radical politician Musa Marandura launched protests against 
the central government and local customary chiefs, both of whom he saw 
as conservative and beholden to western imperialism. To rally support, 
Marandura, whose main constituency was the Fulero community, also 
started to agitate against the neighbouring Rundi community, claiming 
that, as immigrants from Burundi, they did not have a right to customary 
power. A similar dynamic was visible in the mountainous Hauts Plateaux 
overlooking Uvira, where rebels from the Bembe community fought 
against Banyamulenge militias allied to the government forces, who were 
perceived as immigrants from Rwanda. Thus national and local agendas 
started to overlap and became mutually reinforcing.
1 Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).
2 Koen Vlassenroot, South Kivu: Identity, Territory and Power in the Eastern Congo (London: 
Rift Valley Institute, 2013), pp. 22–9.
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In North Kivu, local ethnic antagonisms overshadowed politics at the 
national and international level in the years following independence. The 
so-called Kanyarwanda War, which progressed in fits and starts between 
1962–5, pitted Hutu and Tutsi who had come from Rwanda during and just 
after the colonial period against the Hunde, Tembo, and Nyanga popula-
tions. These immigrants, who had become the demographic majority 
in parts of Masisi and Rutshuru territoires, together with Kinyarwanda-
speaking populations living in these areas since before colonialism, were 
denied access to customary power. Since elections would allow them 
to translate their demographic weight into actual political power, the 
introduction of democracy and the simultaneous redrawing of provincial 
boundaries led to an escalation of tensions. Attempts to disenfranchise 
this group provoked serious bouts of fighting before the 1965 elections, 
leaving bitter memories on all sides.3
The opening of political space and electoral competition fuelled violent 
mobilization during this period, a testament in part to manipulations by 
politicians, who provided the organization and funds to transform local 
grievances into violence. Under the influence of national and international 
revolutionaries such as Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, some of this violence took 
the shape of rebellion. While Marandura managed to initiate a cycle of 
local protests, for example, it was not until representatives of the revolu-
tionary Conseil national de libération (CNL, National Liberation Council) 
took over control and started to organize the protesters militarily that 
this popular movement evolved into a rebellion.4
As intense as the upheaval of the post-independence era was, it was 
short-lived. After Joseph-Désiré Mobutu overthrew the elected govern-
ment in 1965, he successfully suppressed insurrections in the Kivus, 
although pockets of resistance continued in South Kivu’s Fizi and North 
3 Stanislas Bucyalimwe Mararo, ‘Land, Power and Ethnic Conflict in Masisi (Congo-
Kinshasa), 1940s–1994’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 30 (1997), pp. 
503–38.
4 Benoît Verhaegen, Rébellions Au Congo. Tome 1 (Brussels/Leopoldville: CRISP, IRES, 
and INEP, 1966), pp. 292–5.
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Kivu’s Ruwenzori area, along the border with Uganda. However, Mobutu 
only managed to regain coercive supremacy with the help of foreign 
mercenaries and generous foreign military assistance to prop up the 
ramshackle Armée nationale congolaise (ANC, Congolese National Army), 
including American air support. Mobutu’s establishment of one-party 
rule and the development of a strong presidential patronage network 
that dominated both the administration and crucial parts of the security 
apparatus, then quelled serious armed mobilization for almost three 
decades.
Direct predecessors of contemporary armed groups (1990–6)
Faced with dwindling resources and strong international pressure after 
the end of the Cold War, Mobutu announced a transition to multiparty 
democracy in April 1990. Behind the scenes, however, he sought to derail 
the fledgling democratization process by dividing and weakening the 
opposition. One tool he used was to stoke ethnic antagonisms. Ethnic 
divisions in this period were compounded by the prospect of elections, 
which pushed the contested issue of citizenship for descendants of 
Rwandan immigrants into the foreground.
The steady erosion of public service provision under Mobutu, along 
with the ban on political parties, had triggered the proliferation of 
community-based groups throughout the Kivus. In the 1990s, these 
mutuelles (collectives, or community self-help groups) became the basis 
for electoral mobilization and political parties. A number of these 
organizations, in particular the Hutu Mutuelle des agriculteurs du Virunga 
(MAGRIVI, Virunga Agricultural Collective), launched their own militias, 
evidence of the community-driven nature of such early mobilization.5
Other groups were formed during this time to challenge the existing 
political order. At the start of the 1990s, the Kasindiens, an armed group 
emerging from the Nande community in the Ruwenzori area, targeted 
5 Jean-Claude Willame, Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge. Violences Ethniques et Gestion de 
L’identitaire Au Kivu (Brussels/Paris: Institut Africain-CEDAF/l’Harmattan, 1997), p. 64.
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the authority of customary chiefs. This phenomenon spread to nearby 
Beni and Lubero, where the Ngilima militia, linked to local protection 
rackets, set out to challenge Mobutu’s power. These groups influenced 
the formation of other rural militias, such as the Batiri (dominated by 
Hunde from Masisi) and the Katuku, operating first in southern Walikale 
among the Nyanga, then also among the Tembo in Bunyakiri.6 Many 
of today’s armed group commanders began their careers during this 
period, including General Padiri Bulenda, Bigembe Turinkino, Akilimali 
Shemongo, and Robert Seninga.7
These militias were used by local authorities and politicians in long-
standing disputes over land and customary authority. These disputes 
were accentuated by broad socio-economic developments, including 
growing demographic and land pressure, increasing poverty, and the 
decline of the state’s infrastructure and regulatory capacities. Inflamma-
tory speeches and actions by provincial and national politicians added 
fuel to this fire. For example, the first wave of large-scale violence that 
took place in North Kivu in this era erupted two days after the Vice-
Governor of North Kivu gave a rousingly divisive speech at Ntoto, in his 
native Walikale territory, in March 1993.8
After more than six months of violence, during which between 6,000–
15,000 people were killed and thousands displaced, Mobutu ordered the 
presidential guard—one of the few parts of the security apparatus still 
under his full control—to put down the unrest. While conflicts continued 
6 Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Violence et constitution de milices dans L’est du Congo: le cas 
des Mai-mayi’, in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2001–2002, (ed. Filip Reyntjens and 
Stefaan Marysse) (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2002), pp. 115–52.
7 Padiri became the leader of the largest Mai-Mai group in Bunyakiri and eventually led 
an umbrella group of Mai-Mai in South Kivu; Bigembe was the leader of a Hutu armed 
group in southern Masisi where he was the chief of Katoyi sector; Akilimali was a Nyanga 
Mai-Mai who joined Padiri and is today a colonel in the army; Robert Seninga was one of 
the most important Hutu commanders in 1993 and is today a provincial parliamentarian 
involved in militia politics.
8 Jason Stearns, North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern 
Congo (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), p. 26.
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to smoulder afterwards, it was not until the Burundian and Rwandan civil 
wars spilled over into the Kivus that violence resurfaced on a large scale.
In 1993, tens of thousands of Burundian refugees arrived in South 
Kivu following the outbreak of a civil war sparked by the assassination 
of the democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. Then 
came the Rwandan genocide of 1994 prompting 30,000–40,000 Hutu 
militiamen and soldiers of the Forces armées rwandaises (FAR, Rwandan 
Armed Forces)—most of whom had been involved in the genocide—to 
cross from Rwanda, along with a million civilian refugees. With them 
came weapons, radicalism, and ethnic polarization. Regrouping in the 
refugee camps, these fighters started to launch cross-border attacks on 
Rwanda.9 This security threat pushed the newly established government 
in Kigali, in coordination with Uganda, Angola, and other countries 
in the region, to mount a regional insurgent coalition to disband the 
garrison-refugee camps in the Kivus and to topple President Mobutu.
The Congo Wars and the transformation of armed mobilization  
(1996–2003)
The outbreak of the First Congo War in 1996, unleashed by the Rwandan-
backed insurgency of the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du 
Congo-Zaïre (AFDL, Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo-Zaire), triggered armed mobilization across the east. While some 
groups mobilized against the invasion, others came to support the AFDL 
rebellion. Although these militias caused significant insecurity in rural 
areas and fed on-going communal tensions, they generally remained 
fragmented, weak, and parochial, unable to influence events beyond 
their local fiefs.
It was during the Second Congo War—which started after the souring 
of relations between the new President Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his 
Rwandan backers—that these militias began to flourish, with support 
9 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a 
Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 24–9.
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from Kinshasa and foreign armed groups. The Rassemblement congolais 
pour la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy), backed by 
Rwanda and Uganda, rapidly occupied large parts of the east. With the 
war on the front lines at a stalemate, Kinshasa began to funnel funds and 
weapons to armed groups in RCD-held areas, appointing some Mai-Mai 
leaders as senior officers in the national army. It also forged alliances 
with the remnants of the ex-FAR soldiers and Interahamwe (‘Those who 
attack together’)––a Rwandan Hutu paramilitary organization that had 
arrived in the eastern DRC in 1994 and later known as the Forces démocra-
tiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Liberation Forces of 
Rwanda)—as well as with the Burundian Conseil national pour la défense 
de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD, National 
Council/Forces for the Defence of Democracy).10
Over time, the Congo Wars changed the nature of armed groups, 
as locally rooted rural militias became enmeshed in networks led by 
business and political elites. These militia networks drove and were 
driven by the development of a war economy, which thrived on illegal 
taxation, smuggling, and racketeering. While this economy allowed for 
the quick enrichment of some, millions of civilians depended on it for 
survival, leaving them little choice but to collaborate with armed groups.11
The rise of military strongmen, who became deeply involved in local 
administration, further eroded established structures of authority and 
social cohesion. While militias in the 1990s relied on support from 
customary chiefs and local communities, these ties weakened when 
military leaders developed autonomous bases of revenue and support 
through linkages to Kinshasa, foreign armed groups, and regional trade 
networks. At the same time, the large-scale recruitment of youngsters 
10 The CNDD-FDD was a Hutu-dominated politico-military movement led by Léonard 
Nyangoma. Soon after its foundation in 1994, its armed wing moved into the territoires of 
Uvira and Fizi in South Kivu.
11 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘Introduction’ in Conflict and Social 
Transformation in Eastern DR Congo (eds. Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers) 
(Ghent: Academia Press Scientific Publishers, 2004), pp. 13–38.
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created a militarized generation that became increasingly detached from 
customary chiefs, village elders, and parents. The reduced dependence 
on, and accountability to, local authority led to deteriorating behaviour 
towards civilians, and physical abuse, forced labour, and illegal taxation 
started to proliferate.12
Transition: The challenges of demilitarization and army integration 
(2003–6)
In December 2002, the main belligerents of the Second Congo War 
signed the Accord global et inclusif (Global and Inclusive Agreement), a 
political and military power-sharing deal. The three-year long peace 
process starting in 2003 left an indelible mark on Congolese society. 
Much of this was positive: meaningful elections were held in 2006, for 
the first time in over 40 years; the country was reunited; and a new 
constitution enshrined the rights of citizens as never before. Positions 
in the transitional government, parliament, and other state institutions 
were divided between the various signatories, and their armed wings 
were integrated into a new national army, the FARDC.
But the peace process introduced two new dynamics that would foster 
armed mobilization. The integration of some of the former belligerents 
into the army created malcontents, who used new insurgencies as a form 
of bargaining. They were encouraged by the power-sharing logic of the 
transition, which condoned the use of violence to access political power.13 
The second dynamic was ostensibly benign: political competition in the 
context of democracy. However, in a strongly militarized environment 
characterized by ethnic antagonisms, some politicians turned to armed 
and ethnic mobilization as a shortcut to maintaining influence. Elections 
also produced losers, some of whom then resorted to violence.
12 Koen Vlassenroot and Frank van Acker, ‘War as Exit from Exclusion? The Formation 
of Mayi-Mayi Militias in Eastern Congo’, Afrika Focus 17 (2001), pp. 51–77.
13 Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The Hidden Costs of Power-sharing: Reproducing 
Insurgent Violence in Africa’, African Affairs 104 (2005), pp. 375–98.
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These dynamics were most clearly manifested in the trajectory of 
the deeply unpopular RCD. The group went from controlling almost a 
third of the country to holding just 15 seats in the 500-strong National 
Assembly after the 2006 elections. This marginalization was felt 
particularly strongly by the Tutsi community, which had become highly 
influential thanks to the RCD.
The main insurgency of this period arose partly in reaction to this loss 
of power. Led by dissident General Laurent Nkunda, a number of ex-RCD 
Tutsi officers refused army integration, along with three brigades loyal 
to them. In light of on-going activity by the FDLR and Mai-Mai groups, 
they feared for the security of the Tutsi community—but they also had 
the backing of officials in Goma and Kigali, who wanted to protect their 
own economic and political interests in the Kivus. Defecting from the 
army in 2003, Nkunda formed the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple 
(CNDP, National Congress for the Defence of the People) in 2006: it 
would grow to be one of the most powerful armed groups in the country, 
in part due to Rwandan backing.14
For their part, Mai-Mai groups faced different challenges during the 
transition, which would similarly prompt many to take up arms again. 
The government and armed forces were run largely through patronage 
networks: to obtain promotion and access to informal sources of revenue, 
connections to influential military or political leaders were essential. 
The various Mai-Mai commanders who balked at integration—including 
Dunia Lwendama, Delphin Mbaenda, and Kapopo Alunda—often lacked 
these elite connections. Many had only enjoyed rudimentary military 
education; some lacked basic literacy, further reducing their chances 
for promotion. Some were also hesitant to leave their constituencies in 
the face of security concerns created by former adversaries who refused 
14 Jason Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo 
(London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012).
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to dismantle their armed groups.15 The few Mai-Mai commanders who 
did obtain positions of importance, like General Padiri Bulenda, used 
nominations to reward members of their own ethnic community or family, 
side-lining many of their former fellow commanders. Of the Mai-Mai 
delegates to the peace talks in South Africa, the two representing the 
largest groups—Anselme Enerunga, of Padiri’s movement, and Kosco 
Swedy, representing the Dunia group—were eventually repudiated by 
their commanders in the field.
The marginalization of Mai-Mai networks coincided with their 
increasing fragmentation, rendering them vulnerable to manipulation 
by the government in Kinshasa, which sought to control these groups by 
co-opting some of their leaders. In total, Mai-Mai groups from across the 
eastern Congo were given 13 out of 620 seats in the transitional parlia-
ment, four out of 63 ministerial positions, and one of the 11 provincial 
governorates. But the way in which positions were doled out bred discon-
tent. One Mai-Mai officer described it as follows: ‘Our delegates got to 
Kinshasa and then began selling the positions we had a claim to. People 
who had nothing to do with the Mai-Mai could buy one of the military or 
political positions that belonged to us. It was our own internal weakness 
that allowed them to do this.’16 Thus Kisula Ngoy, who had only marginal 
links to Mai-Mai, became Governor of Katanga, while Mushi Bonane, a 
lawyer based in Kinshasa, claimed a Mai-Mai parliamentary seat.
As a result of these various developments, dozens of dissident Mai-Mai 
commanders returned to the bush between 2007–9. Due to on-going 
insecurity, in part caused by foreign armed groups such as the FDLR, and 
continuing local conflicts, they could easily attract recruits and mobilize 
support. The absence of a strong, impartial army further bolstered the 
belief that communal self-defence was justified and necessary.
15 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, Between Integration and Disintegration: The 
Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2013).
16 Usalama Project Interviewee #814, via telephone, June 2013.
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Fragmentation and the revolving door of military integration (2006–12)
The 2006 elections brought an end to the transition but failed to end 
violence in the eastern DRC. Dozens of new armed groups were formed, 
backed by officers and politicians who had failed to obtain the votes and 
positions they had hoped for. The government did little to counteract 
this. For those who chose the route of continued dissidence, there were 
few consequences: army deserters were rarely punished and sustained 
military pressure on armed groups was rare. With the army still under 
construction and lacking both cohesion and capacity, the government in 
Kinshasa saw few alternatives to a strategy of co-option, especially of 
groups who did not pose a direct threat to its power.17
Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP was at the centre of this new round of mobili-
zation. Beginning in 2006, the FARDC launched repeated offensives 
against this group—an escalation that triggered a cascade of counter-
mobilizations by other groups including the Coalition des patriotes résistants 
congolais (PARECO, Alliance of Resistant Congolese Patriots). There 
were two reasons for this development. First, the FARDC, unsure of 
its own officers’ competence and loyalty, often backed ethnic militias 
with weapons and money. Secondly, the fighting spread insecurity in the 
countryside, triggering mobilization (often among demobilized soldiers) 
in the name of communal self-defence.18
Much of this mobilization, as well as the cynical manipulation of armed 
groups, happened in the run-up to the Goma Conference of January 2008, 
which aimed to bring an end to the escalation. Perversely, however, the 
conference led to a further proliferation of armed groups. According to 
one senior Congolese intelligence officer, ‘The government’s logic during 
the Goma Conference was to create new groups in order to dilute the 
17 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘The Volatility of a Half-cooked 
Bouillabaisse: Rebel-military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in Eastern DRC’, 
African Affairs 112/449 (2013), pp. 563–82.
18 Jason Stearns, PARECO: Land, Local Strongmen and the Roots of Militia Politics in North 
Kivu (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013).
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CNDP’s power.’19 Other politicians or rebel leaders did not wait to be 
asked by Kinshasa: hoping to benefit from anticipated integration into 
the army or lucrative demobilization packages, they either created new 
groups, revived dormant ones, or stepped up recruitment. For example, 
a local politician from Mwenga created the Mai-Mai Shikito around this 
time. According to a senior leader of the group, weapons were distributed 
to dozens of young fighters, who were led by FARDC defectors.20 Other 
such groups that were re-created or bolstered for the occasion include the 
Mai-Mai Mahoro, Mudundu 40, the Mai-Mai Ruwenzori, and the Union 
des jeunes patriotes sacrifiés (UJPS, Union of Young Sacrificed Patriots). 
Once again, an accord aimed at the co-option of groups by integrating 
them into the state apparatus created incentives for armed mobilization, 
both among those anticipating gains and those disappointed with the 
results.21
The ceasefire initiated by the Goma peace process rapidly unravelled, 
paving the way for renewed escalation. After several humiliating defeats, 
President Kabila decided in late 2008 to negotiate directly with the 
Rwandan government, which was under increased donor scrutiny over 
its support for the CNDP. In January 2009, the parameters of a peace 
deal became known: the CNDP’s leader Laurent Nkunda was arrested 
by the Rwandan army, which then deployed troops to the Kivus to hunt 
down the FDLR in joint operations with the FARDC. Two months later, 
on 23 March, an agreement was signed which stipulated that the CNDP 
should be transformed into a political party and its troops integrated into 
the Congolese army. Refusing to be redeployed across the country, many 
CNDP officers stayed in the Kivus, where they formed an influential 
network taking lead positions in another round of operations against 
the FDLR.
19 Usalama Project Interviewee #811, Bukavu, June 2013.
20 Usalama Project Interviewee #837, Bukavu, 26 April 2013.
21 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘Kivu’s Intractable Security 
Conundrum’, African Affairs 108/432 (2009), pp. 475–84.
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This arrangement solved one problem while creating another. The deal 
with the CNDP provoked widespread resentment. The main complaint 
related to the favourable terms of integration provided to the CNDP, 
which maintained parallel chains of command, intelligence, and logistics 
within the army. Former CNDP officers also dominated the newly created 
operational command structures for the Kivus, and brigades controlled 
by the ex-CNDP were deployed to the most resource-rich sites, allowing 
them to extend their military and economic influence well beyond their 
traditional stronghold in Masisi. This confirmed the conviction held by 
many FARDC officers and armed group leaders that Tutsi and Hutu were 
given preferential treatment in the army.22
While the operations against the FDLR and other armed groups 
launched between 2009 and 2011—dubbed successively Umoja Wetu (‘Our 
Unity’), Kimia (‘Silence’) II, and Amani Leo (‘Peace Today’)—managed to 
weaken the FDLR, they were extremely detrimental to civilians, displacing 
over a million people and causing widespread insecurity. Moreover, 
together with resentment about the ex-CNDP’s new-found dominance, 
these offensives bolstered some other armed groups, including Sikuli 
Lafontaine’s PARECO faction and Janvier Karairi Bwingo’s Alliance patrio-
tique pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS, Patriotic Alliance for a Free 
and Sovereign Congo) in North Kivu, and the Mai-Mai Yakutumba in 
South Kivu.23
An army restructuring process, launched in 2011 and intended to 
dismantle some of the influence gained by the CNDP within the military 
hierarchy, provoked further mobilization. The temporary withdrawal of 
troops from the field to reorganize them from brigades into regiments 
created a security vacuum rapidly filled by armed groups, such as the 
22 UN Security Council, S/2010/596, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’, 
29 November 2010, pp. 42–6; UN Security Council, S/2011/738, ‘Final Report of the Group 
of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 2 December 2011, pp. 89–90.
23 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a 
Rapprochement with Rwanda’, Nairobi/Brussels, 16 November 2010, pp. 11–12.
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Raia Mutomboki.24 Furthermore, discontent about the distribution of 
positions in the newly formed units provoked numerous desertions, with 
many deserters launching new armed groups.25
The 2011 general elections intensified this dynamic, as politicians fell 
back on armed groups to obtain electoral support and, when unsuccessful 
at the polls, to maintain influence. In Fizi, parliamentary candidates like 
Jemsi Mulengwa supported the Mai Mai Yakutumba,26 while the mwami 
(customary chief) of the Fulero in Uvira, who also ran for parliament, 
mobilized his personal self-defence militia, the Forces d’autodéfense locales et 
légitimes (FALL, Local Legitimate Self-defence Forces) for his campaign.27
The M23: A turning point? (2012–present)
The integration deal signed on 23 March 2009 unravelled as the result of 
a standoff between Kinshasa and the ex-CNDP leadership in early 2012, 
leading to yet another phase of mobilization. While the FARDC had been 
trying to redeploy the ex-CNDP leadership away from the Kivus since 
2009, the 2011 electoral fiasco led President Kabila to intensify these 
efforts. Partly driven by international pressure, he also tried to arrest 
General Bosco Ntaganda, who was wanted by the International Criminal 
Court. However, in a pre-emptive move, parts of the ex-CNDP mutinied 
in April 2012. This dissent morphed into a new rebellion, the M23, which 
effectively split the ex-CNDP network. Roughly half of the ex-CNDP 
24 Jason Stearns et al., Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of 
an Armed Franchise (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013).
25 UN Security Council, S/2012/843, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’, 
15 November 2012, p. 33.
26 Stearns et al., Mai-Mai Yakutumba, pp. 41–42.
27 Centre Indépendant des Recherches et d’Etudes Stratégiques au Kivu (CIRESKI), 
‘Étude analytique sur la milice «FAL»’, December 2012 (unpublished report, on file with 
the Usalama Project).
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officers did not join the M23, resisting pressure by Rwandan authorities 
who became increasingly involved in managing the rebellion.28
The M23 crisis reverberated through the region, triggering the 
formation or the strengthening of several opposing groups in its area 
of deployment in Rutshuru, including the FDLR-Soki, the Mai-Mai 
Shetani, the Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense (MPA, Popular Self-defence 
Movement), and the Forces pour la défense des intérêts du peuple congolais 
(FDIPC, Forces for the Defence of the Interests of the Congolese People). 
Increased mobilization also resulted from efforts by the M23 and its allies 
in Rwanda to forge alliances or create new groups throughout the east 
such as the Alliance pour la libération de l’est du Congo (ALEC, Alliance for 
the Liberation of East Congo) in Uvira and the Force oecuménique pour la 
libération du Congo (FOLC, Ecumenical Force for the Liberation of Congo) 
led by FARDC deserter Hilaire Kombi in the Beni area in northern North 
Kivu. It also tried to orchestrate coalitions of armed groups in Ituri—
efforts that largely failed.
Aside from army deserters like Kombi, marginalized politicians often 
played a crucial role in these mobilization efforts. In the north of North 
Kivu, Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi, an MP and former foreign minister, 
organized significant political support for and donated arms to Kombi’s 
group.29 In South Kivu, failed parliamentary candidate Gustave Bagay-
amukwe spearheaded the creation of a new M23 satellite called Union 
des forces révolutionnaires du Congo (UFRC, Union of Revolutionary Forces 
of Congo) at the end of 2012.30 Most of these groups, however, were 
very small, and the M23 did not achieve a broader destabilization of 
the region.
28 UN Security Council, S/2012/348/Add.1, ‘Addendum to the Interim report of the 
Group of Experts on the DRC’, 27 June 2012, pp. 11–12.
29 UN Security Council, S/2012/843, pp. 19–27. 
30 UN Security Council, S/2013/433, ‘Midterm report of the UN Group of Experts on the 
DRC’, 19 July 2013, pp. 13–15.
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While Kinshasa established operational alliances with some armed 
groups, it tried to dismantle others.31 Using financial inducements 
and generous promises of ranks and positions, it offered deals to the 
Mai-Mai groups under Yakutumba, Mayele, Nyakiliba, and Kifuafua; 
several Nyatura groups; Cobra Matata’s Force de résistance patriotique en 
Ituri (FRPI, Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force); and a plethora of militias 
in Uvira.32 But by the end of 2013, only the integration of a part of the 
Nyatura combatants appeared successful, and clashes with numerous of 
the other integration candidates multiplied, especially in Fizi, Uvira, and 
the district of Ituri.
In August 2013, a large-scale FARDC offensive against the M23—
backed by the newly established United Nations Force Intervention 
Brigade (FIB)—achieved a number of military successes. But even if 
these succeed in dismantling the M23, the many other armed groups in 
the east are likely to continue to stir violence, especially as long as the 
drivers of armed mobilization are not addressed.
Explaining the persistence of armed groups
To understand why the eastern DRC continues to experience the prolif-
eration of armed groups, three sets of factors should be considered. The 
first is the heightened competition between political and military elite 
networks at the regional, national, and provincial level, compounded by 
a weak political centre in Kinshasa. Second, there are factors within the 
eastern DRC that promote the militarization of political and economic 
competition. Third are local conflicts and grievances related to land, 
local authority, and insecurity. There are additional factors, including the 
abundance of weaponry, widespread poverty, and the difficult topography 
of the eastern DRC. But many other countries—and large parts of the 
western DRC—share such problems without experiencing similar levels 
31 UN Security Council, S/2012/843, pp. 29 and 33. 
32 UN Security Council, S/2012/843, pp. 32–4.
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of armed conflict. These factors help explain why armed groups are easy 
to form and why they survive, but not their high incidence in the east.
A weak centre and competing elites 
The transition, which culminated in the 2006 national elections, unified 
the country at the price of sparking new conflicts. The Global and Inclu-
sive Agreement of 2002 had drawn belligerents into a power-sharing 
government but also marginalized some of the most powerful armed 
groups, and fragmented others. Especially in the east, factions tried to 
maintain the spheres of political and economic influence they had built 
up during the wars, resisting Kinshasa’s efforts to reassert its authority. 
The ensuing power struggle between the political centre and elites in 
the east is the latest manifestation of a trend that has characterized the 
Congolese state since its creation. 
President Mobutu largely managed to overcome resistance against the 
influence of the centre through a combination of coercion and co-option—
and one of the keys to his success was the establishment of a strong and 
relatively inclusive patronage network that controlled access to vital 
economic assets.33 Joseph Kabila, by contrast, has failed to construct a 
similar patronage network to consolidate his control over the east. The 
Congo Wars reinforced the regional orientation of the east’s economy, 
thus rendering local elites less dependent on economic connections to 
and patronage from Kinshasa. In North Kivu, flourishing cross-border 
networks were created that encompassed Congolese, Rwandan, and 
Ugandan traders, administrators, and military elites. During the 2003–6 
transition, these networks largely co-opted newly appointed political and 
administrative authorities, thereby maintaining their autonomy from 
Kinshasa.34
33 Denis Tull, The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu 
(DR Congo) (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2005), pp. 64–93.
34 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘New Political Order in the DR Congo? 
The Transformation of Regulation’, Afrika Focus 21 (2008), pp. 39–52.
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Such cross-border networks have also facilitated on-going armed 
mobilization. For example, during the wars, Burundian rebels of both the 
CNDD-FDD and the Forces nationales de libération (FNL, National Libera-
tion Forces) collaborated extensively with Mai-Mai groups in Fizi and 
Uvira. Parts of these networks, which extend into Tanzania, have stayed 
intact, contributing to the refusal of certain Mai-Mai groups to integrate 
into the Congolese army. Diasporas and refugee camps in neighbouring 
countries have contributed to the fostering of such regional links, facili-
tating recruitment and smuggling.35
The most important backlash to the transition came from one such 
regional network, which links Congolese Tutsi elites in Goma to their 
counterparts in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government in Kigali. 
Kigali became an important logistical and financial hub for the CNDP 
rebels, who could also recruit directly among Congolese refugees on 
Rwandan soil. Although Kigali never entirely controlled the rebels, it 
did provide crucial support, including direct military assistance by the 
Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).36 These regional links have undermined 
the orientation of these provincial elites towards distant Kinshasa, which 
continues to be seen with distrust, not least because of the anti-Tutsi 
rhetoric prevalent within parts of the government.37
The political centre that emerged in Kinshasa after the Second Congo 
War is weak. While controlling key parts of the state apparatus, Kabila’s 
patronage network has failed to fully co-opt political, military and 
business elites in the east, thus fostering on-going power competition. 
Regional connections have intensified these power struggles, drawing 
in elites and diaspora populations from neighbouring countries, while 
reinforcing the eastward orientation of the economy in the Kivus.
35 UN Security Council, S/2009/603, ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’, 
23 November 2009, pp. 11–2 and 20–2.
36 UN Security Council, S/2008/773, ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’, 
12 December 2008, pp. 6–18.
37 For an analysis of the Rwandan government’s interests in the eastern DRC, see Jason 
Stearns, From CNDP to M23, pp. 54–8.
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The militarization of political and economic competition
A second key factor in the proliferation of armed groups is the violent 
character of the competition between regional, national and provincial 
elites. The militarization of politics was essentially triggered by the 
power-sharing logic of the Global and Inclusive Agreement of 2002, 
integrating former belligerents into state and army—including many 
groups that lacked their own political structure or even a coherent 
political programme. Kinshasa’s strategy—co-opting leaders from such 
groups in order to benefit from their quotas in the transitional govern-
ment and influence their constituencies—only encouraged further 
fragmentation. Leaders who enjoyed Kinshasa’s favour did not hesitate 
to sideline core members of their own networks—and by the end of the 
transition process, it was precisely these marginalized figures that led 
the new wave of armed group formation.
The government’s approach to dealing with these dissidents was 
counterproductive. Once again, they offered them military integration 
on favourable terms, including impunity for past crimes, permission 
to stay in their areas of origin, promises of high ranks and positions, 
considerable sums of cash, and (only occasionally) the accreditation of 
political parties. At the same time, those withdrawing from army integra-
tion generally faced few sanctions: punishments for desertions have been 
rare, many groups have never been confronted with significant military 
pressure, and deserters have always been welcomed back into the fold, 
creating a revolving door of army integration and defection.38
But it is not only dissatisfied army officers that have been involved in 
armed mobilization: in many cases politicians have been key supporters 
of armed groups. Perversely, one of the reasons for this has been the new 
democratic logic of power. It is often easier to gain popular approval by 
38 Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, ‘Volatility’, p. 571–3. The CNDP is but the most well-
known of such examples: many commanders have followed similar trajectories, including 
Albert Kahasha, Delphin Mbaenda, Mahoro Kitay Ngombarufu, and Patient Akilimali. 
Others, such as Amuri Yakutumba and Cobra Matata deserted and have engaged in 
repeated negotiations and integration efforts ever since with no success.
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being an homme fort (local strongman) and exploiting ethnic divisions 
than by effecting real policy change. A strongman can dole out cash, 
manage football teams, and fund development projects through his or her 
own private means. Backing armed groups has thus become an additional 
avenue for rallying popularity. ‘Almost every single armed group here has 
backing by politicians in Kinshasa or Bukavu,’ a Congolese intelligence 
officer in South Kivu reported; ‘it creates employment and makes it seem 
like you are backing the community.’39 A local customary chief in North 
Kivu had a less cynical view: ‘Why did Bakungu Mithondeke [a former 
vice-governor of North Kivu] help create PARECO? Because they protect 
the community. It makes the Hunde love him.’40
With the backing of an armed group, an individual politician also 
acquires influence in Kinshasa: in the words of one former armed 
group member in North Kivu, it makes him an ‘homme incontournable 
[an indispensable person]’.41 ‘Why do you think Serufuli is still seen as 
someone important in Kinshasa?42 He is the number one strongman in 
the Hutu community, and that means he can influence Hutu militias and 
commanders,’ a former Rwandan intelligence officer stated.43 But the 
relations between armed groups and politicians work both ways: while 
politicians can gain in stature and influence through connections with 
armed groups, armed groups actively seek out politicians to represent 
them in negotiations with the government. 
Armed groups can also directly influence electoral politics. This 
occurred in 2011, for example, in Masisi and Walikale, where both the 
APCLS and the Mai-Mai Sheka/Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC) tried to 
39 Usalama Project Interviewee #818, Baraka, March 2013.
40 Usalama Project Interviewee #819, Goma, 29 March 2013. 
41 Usalama Project Interviewee #820, Goma, April 2013. 
42 Eugène Serufuli, governor of North Kivu from 2000–7; see Stearns, From CNDP to 
M23, pp. 21 and 47.
43 Usalama Project Interviewee #815, Goma, April 2013.
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influence voter registration.44 Both these groups epitomize the militariza-
tion of politics in the eastern DRC and the impunity that enables it: the 
APCLS has been able to register as a political party, and Sheka Ntabo 
Ntaberi ran for parliamentary elections in 2011—despite being widely 
known as the leader of an armed group and having been implicated in 
mass atrocities.45
Sheka is the prime example of another trend that has fostered armed 
group proliferation: the militarization of economic competition. A former 
mining pit manager in Walikale, Sheka is believed to have started his 
career as a rebel leader in 2009 mainly to protect his and others’ mining 
interests. These include the investments of the deputy commander of the 
8th Military Region, Colonel Etienne Bindu, who was instrumental in 
the creation of the group.46 While for other armed groups such economic 
considerations have played a smaller role, safeguarding economic inter-
ests clearly forms part of the attraction of armed mobilization in the 
eastern DRC.
Opportunities for profiteering extend far beyond minerals: militias 
have exploited and traded charcoal, hardwoods, cannabis, fish, and wild 
animals.47 In addition, almost all armed groups depend heavily on illegal 
taxation, usually obtained at road-blocks and markets, and through food 
collections in villages.48 Some groups—like the FDLR and the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan armed group largely operating in 
the Ruwenzori borderlands—also cultivate food crops on a large scale, 
trade consumer items, and have extensive investments in urban areas, 
44 UN Security Council, S/2011/738, pp. 64–7.
45 Azzad Essa, ‘Wanted Congo rebel holds campaign rally’, Al Jazeera, 25 November 
2011.
46 UN Security Council, S/2011/738, pp. 59–62.
47 Ann Laudati, ‘Beyond Minerals: Broadening Economies of Violence in Eastern DRC’, 
Review of African Political Economy 40 (2013), pp. 32–50.
48 Steven van Damme, ‘Commodities of War: Communities Speak Out on the True Cost 
of Conflict in Eastern DRC’, Oxfam, 20 November 2012.
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owning shops, motor-cycles, and pharmacies.49 These activities require 
collaborators within the state and business sectors, evidence of armed 
groups’ broader social underpinnings.
Local roots of armed groups: Land, local authority, and identity
As much as armed mobilization is spurred by elites, it is always also 
driven by local dynamics.50 While the level of popular support varies from 
group to group, many have sympathizers and collaborators. One reason 
for this is that the alternatives are often worse: an unreliable and abusive 
government army, or, in some cases, predatory foreign armed groups. 
More importantly, some communities with meagre political representa-
tion feel that armed groups are their sole means of expressing grievances 
and making their voices heard. These grievances are often related to 
land conflicts or disputes over customary power, including conflicts 
over succession and the boundaries of administrative entities. Because 
the issues of territory, identity, and customary power all overlap, these 
conflicts have often been fought out between ethnic communities—
although disputes between clans or families have also led to tensions.51
Population pressure, the diminishing availability and fertility of arable 
land, and problematic land governance have all contributed to conflict. 
The Land Law of 1973 gave the state ownership of all land and abolished 
customary tenure, leaving the status of communally owned land to be 
regulated by a future presidential decree. However, the latter was never 
promulgated, creating legal uncertainties. This fostered a system of 
governance in which customary chiefs, whose authority is linked to ethnic 
identity, control access to much of the land in rural areas. However, many 
chiefs have managed the land they control in an opportunistic manner 
49 For the ADF, see UN Security Council, S/2011/738, p. 30. Fieldwork conducted for 
this report in Rutshuru in January 2012 revealed similar investments in businesses and 
shops by the FDLR in the town of Kiwanja.
50 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), pp. 364–87.
51 Vlassenroot, South Kivu, pp. 30–3.
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and with little regard for small-scale farmers, undermining both their 
legitimacy and social cohesion.52
Customary rule has also stirred conflicts in other ways. Some chief-
taincies have been contested since the colonial era. For instance, the 
Fulero in Uvira strongly reject the chiefdom of the Ruzizi Plain, headed 
by a Rundi. Other groups, like the Banyamulenge, complain that the 
Belgian colonial authorities never granted them a paramount chief. In 
yet other cases, succession, the return of chiefs who had fled during the 
wars, or power struggles between customary chiefs and state-appointed 
administrators have been sources of tension. Grievances related to such 
conflicts, or stemming from insecurity, have created fertile ground for 
armed groups. Still, there is little evidence that such grievances on their 
own translate into sustained organized violence. Even where self-defence 
militias have sprung up spontaneously, it is has been mostly through 
organizational and financial contributions by politicians and military 
leaders that such militias have been able to transform into larger-scale 
and more influential groups.
This is not to reject any connection between local conflicts, violence, 
and armed group mobilization, but simply to note that this relation is 
complex. Armed groups draw on local conflicts for popular mobiliza-
tion, because those conflicts provide narratives around which they can 
rally the population, attract recruits, and justify taxation. In many cases, 
these narratives centre on communal self-defence and what is known as 
autochthony: the idea that a community was the first to inhabit a certain 
place, so entitling them to land and the exercise of customary power. 
For instance, while the APCLS cite the expropriation of land as one of 
their main grievances, Banyamulenge armed groups have consistently 
52 Frank van Acker, ‘Where Did All the Land Go? Enclosure and Social Struggle in Kivu 
(D.R. Congo)’, Review of African Political Economy 32 (2005), pp. 79–98.
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demanded an administrative entity of their own, as justified by the arrival 
of their community in South Kivu before the colonial era.53
In many cases, local conflicts and grievances are not merely drawn 
upon but actively manipulated by elites, to legitimize their actions and 
maintain a power base. Amuri Yakutumba, the Bembe leader of a Mai-Mai 
group in Fizi, claimed for years that he was in the bush because of the 
insurgency by the Forces républicaines fédéralistes (FRF, Republican Feder-
alist Forces)—a rebellion by Banyamulenge, who the Bembe perceive as 
intruders. But when the FRF integrated into the FARDC in January 2011, 
Yakutumba still refused to demobilize. 
Additionally, it is often the presence of armed groups that leads local 
conflicts to turn violent, rather than these conflicts leading to the forma-
tion of armed groups. For instance, it is doubtful whether the customary 
conflict around the chefferie (chiefdom) of the Ruzizi Plain would have 
escalated to such an extent, were it not for the presence of the Mai-Mai 
group of Bede Rusagara, a family member of one of the local authori-
ties who is a key figure in the conflict. Yet the creation of Bede’s group 
had little to do with the conflict around the chefferie. His defection from 
the army in 2011 had been facilitated by officers in the FARDC, and his 
initial contacts were primarily with Burundian armed groups and then 
the M23.54 It was only later that he became heavily involved in the local 
power conflict.
To conclude, there is a complex relationship between armed groups 
and local conflicts and grievances in the eastern DRC. The latter interact 
with elite competition in the context of a political order that provides 
incentives to use violence and thus promote the proliferation of militias. 
Difficult army integration processes and the functioning of the Congolese 
army have only contributed to this.
53 Jason Stearns et al., Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu 
(London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013).
54 UN Security Council, S/2012/843, pp. 21–3.
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3. The Congolese army
The stated objective of the Congolese army is to eradicate the various 
armed groups active in the eastern DRC. Instead, it has often directly 
contributed to their proliferation. The FARDC is compromised in several 
respects: by mismanagement on the part of the political leadership of the 
DRC, by the politics of military integration, by weak control and account-
ability, and by poor conditions of service for rank-and-file soldiers.
The Congolese army: Past and present
In order to understand how the FARDC works it is necessary to examine 
the ways in which the Congolese government has been torn between 
competing security imperatives since independence. Emerging from 
colonial rule with a fragmented and weak administration, the ruling elite 
needed the military to suppress rebellions—as it does today. At the same 
time, its leaders were often more afraid of their own military than of 
rebellions, which could be put down with the help of their foreign allies.
Mobutu’s military management
President Mobutu himself seized power in 1965 through a military-backed 
coup. Once in office, still weak, and faced with a fractious political elite, 
he feared that by creating a strong and independent army he might 
create the conditions for his own removal. Bolstered by the inter-
national community, which sent troops and mercenaries to his aid in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Mobutu cultivated a style of military management 
that persists until today: a series of divide-and-rule techniques geared 
towards keeping the army weak, fractured, loyal, and preoccupied with 
affairs outside politics.55 These techniques were to a large extent admin-
istered by Mobutu himself, and an important share of military resources 
55 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 248–75.
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were managed by the president’s maison militaire (Military House), an 
advisory council attached to the presidency, which kept close control 
over key decision-making areas and functions, such as intelligence and 
procurement.
Mobutu also played a key role in human resources management, 
personally appointing officers to important positions. The main criteria 
for appointment were loyalty and patronage, not competence. As one 
former Mobutu officer put it: ‘He kept the army weak and fragmented, 
with a strong core of ethnic loyalists to protect him from threats.’56 
Two failed (and perhaps imaginary) coups in 1975 and 1978 reinforced 
Mobutu’s belief that a strong army was more of a potential threat than 
an asset. Consequently, he purged or demoted many officers from the 
Kasais and the Kivus, while promoting his fellow Bangala from Equateur 
Province. Promotion implied not only higher ranks or positions: there 
were significant informal pay-offs as well. To maintain loyalty, Mobutu 
fostered or tolerated military entrepreneurship, hoping that business 
interests would distract his commanders’ attention from political affairs. 
Thus individual generals built up commercial empires, becoming more 
businessmen than army leaders.57
Despite this lack of meritocracy, not all military staff were poorly 
trained. In the earlier Mobutu period, the army attracted bright and 
ambitious recruits, and officers were sent to military academies in 
countries such as Belgium, Morocco, Greece, China, France, the United 
Kingdom, Israel, and the United States. The Congo also had its own 
academies and elite training centres––especially the École de formation 
des officiers (EFO, Officers Training School) in Kananga and the Centre 
d’entrainement commando (Centre for Special Forces Training) in Kotakoli––
where other African countries sent their officers for training. Few 
56 Usalama Project Interviewee #822, Kinshasa, 23 May 2013.
57 Michael Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), pp. 59–60.
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well-educated officers obtained influential positions, however, although 
they provided core competence in the more technical services.
Internal divisions were also fostered by the creation of competing 
and parallel security services. There were at least half a dozen civilian, 
military, and paramilitary intelligence agencies, including the Centre 
national de documentation (CND, National Documentation Centre), the 
military Service d’action et de renseignements militaires (SARM, Service for 
Action and Military Intelligence) and various agencies within the navy, 
presidency, police, and immigration service. A similar confusing prolif-
eration could be found in the police sector. In 1972, Mobutu dissolved the 
police force, leaving only the Gendarmerie nationale. Twelve years later, he 
created a Garde civile to function as a national police force, but its mandate 
was never clearly demarcated from the Gendarmerie, creating immediate 
competition.58 To make matters worse, the Forces armées zaïroises (FAZ, 
Zairian Armed Forces) also carried out policing tasks, following a tradi-
tion established in the colonial era by which the armed forces fulfilled 
both domestic and external security functions.59
Within the army, competition between agencies and units was no less 
acute: several elite brigades operated almost autonomously from the 
army high command, especially the Korean-trained Kamanyola Brigade. 
Mobutu also had a large presidential guard, the Division spéciale prési-
dentielle (DSP, Special Presidential Division), which was well paid and 
controlled by members of Mobutu’s own ethnic group. The preferential 
treatment of these elite units contrasted sharply with the rest of the 
army, whose soldiers were poorly paid, equipped, and clothed, and often 
left to fend for themselves in rural areas, where they started to prey on 
civilians.
58 Roger C. Glickson and Joshua Sinai, ‘National Security’, in Zaire: A Country Study 
(Area Handbook Series) (eds. Sandra Meditz and Tim Merrill) (Washington DC: Library of 
Congress Federal Research Division, 1994), pp. 278 and 317–18.
59 Bryant P. Shaw, ‘Force Publique, Force Unique: The Military in the Belgian Congo, 
1914–1939’ (Madison: University of Wisconsin PhD thesis, 1984).
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International donors were complicit in this fragmentation of the 
military. As they vied for influence in the context of Cold War rivalry, 
assistance was provided on a purely bilateral basis. Belgium, whose 
officers had headed the colonial army, and the United States, to which 
Zaire was a key Cold War ally, were among the most important donors. 
The US donated USD 174.9 million in training and equipment between 
1960–91, and the Belgian army provided military instructors and equip-
ment, as well as regular places for Congolese officers at the Royal Military 
Academy in Brussels. But other countries gave generous assistance as 
well. At one point, 400 North Korean instructors were in the country, and 
France, Israel, South Africa, and Egypt were also involved in providing 
various forms of financial, technical and educational support.60
In the wake of a humiliating military performance during two invasions 
of Shaba (today’s Katanga province) by remnants of the former seces-
sionist Katangan army in the second half of the 1970s the president 
allowed foreigners to take leadership roles in army units. A French 
colonel briefly commanded the French-trained 31st Airborne Brigade, 
Belgian officers trained and then remained as advisors within the 21st 
Infantry Brigade, and Israeli advisors were attached to the DSP. Foreign 
experts were also crucial for the repair and maintenance of equipment, 
including ground maintenance services for the air force.61 Despite this 
extensive foreign assistance, however, the army remained a weak fighting 
force—but as long as Mobutu could count on foreign military interven-
tion in the face of severe threats to his regime, such as the Shaba wars, 
he could afford to have a poorly performing army.
Factionalism under the Kabilas
Acknowledging Mobutu’s legacy is vital to any understanding of develop-
ments in army reform since Joseph Kabila became president in 2001. He 
60 Glickson and Sinai, ‘National Security’, pp. 308–12.
61 Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 209.
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too arrived in power facing an army riven by internal competition, while 
having to fight numerous rebellions. The AFDL insurgency that had 
brought his father to the presidency, and in which he himself had risen 
to become the commander of land forces, had relied on foreign troops—
primarily from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola—to topple Mobutu. When 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila fell out with his Rwandan and Ugandan allies, 
the Forces armées congolaises (FAC, Congolese Armed Forces) lost its most 
potent allies.
Consequently, Kabila was forced to rely on a mismatch of former 
FAZ officers, newcomers who had started their military career during 
the AFDL and maquisards (rebel fighters) who had fought with him in 
his bush war against Mobutu from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. The 
latter included figures such as Sylvestre Lwetcha, Shabani Sikatenda, and 
Yermos Lokole from Fizi. These officers and their troops, which included 
thousands of ill-trained kadogo (youngsters) recruited for the AFDL insur-
gency, suffered from inexperience, disorganization, and a lack of trust 
among themselves.62 This forced Kabila to fall back on his inner circle of 
loyalists, themselves often poorly trained, including former maquisards 
from Fizi, and Katangans such as Célestin Kifwa, Edy Kapend, and Mufu 
Kiyana. Had it not been for outside support from rebellions and govern-
ments in the region, Kabila’s factionalized force would have most likely 
been defeated—while the intervention of Angolan and Zimbabwean 
troops was essential for halting the rebels’ advance towards Kinshasa, 
Kabila also integrated Rwandan Hutu into FAC units.
Joseph Kabila’s rise to power at such an early age––he was only 29––
and in the wake of his father’s assassination by his own bodyguards, 
heightened the new president’s sense of vulnerability. The political elite 
was fragmented and consumed by intrigues, and he had few people he 
could rely on. Unlike his father, however, he swiftly realized that he would 
not be able to win the war through military force. As one of his former 
62 ICG, ‘How Kabila Lost His Way: The Performance of Laurent Désiré Kabila’s 
Government’, 21 May 1999, pp. 16–20.
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advisors argued: ‘Joseph Kabila does not rule through brute strength. You 
can’t in this country: our state is too weak. He rules through cunning, by 
co-opting his enemies, and by keeping everybody weak.’63
Due to this approach, there was little serious front-line fighting after 
2001; while negotiating with his enemies in Addis Ababa and eventually 
in South Africa’s Sun City, Kabila applied military pressure on them 
largely through networks of militia proxies. Like his father, he funnelled 
money and ammunition to local Mai-Mai groups, as well as Rwandan 
and Burundian rebels.
The FARDC: A product of tenuous power-sharing
The FARDC was created in 2003 by a merger of the belligerents of the 
Second Congo War. At its creation, the army leadership put forward a 
vastly inflated troop figure of 350,000, a number that would be drasti-
cally reduced when biometric identification of troops was introduced. 
Today, it hovers between 120,000–130,000.64 Positions in the FARDC 
were allocated based on the political logic of the power-sharing deal—
with commanders receiving appointments based on their connections, 
not their competence or performance.
The position of Chef d’état-major général (Chief of the General Staff) 
went to the government faction (FAC), as did the air force leadership 
and three of the 11 regional commands. The RCD was able to name the 
minister of defence, the commander of the land forces and two region 
commanders, while the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC, Movement 
for the Liberation of the Congo), which was led by Jean-Pierre Bemba 
and had controlled parts of the north and north-east, won the command 
63 Usalama Project Interviewee #823, Kinshasa, June 2009.
64 Roger Kibasomba, ‘Post War Defence Integration in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’, Institute for Security Studies, 1 December 2005; Usalama Project Interviewee 
#824, Kinshasa, June 2013.
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of the navy and two regional commands.65 In order to add checks and 
balances, many high-ranking commanders were given two deputies from 
different factions. However, rather than fostering trust, this exacerbated 
the politicization of the FARDC and its associated networks.
This arrangement also reinforced Kabila’s tendency to manage the 
security services, where his former enemies now held important positions, 
through informal networks. He tried to circumvent the hierarchy by 
passing through his private military cabinet, the maison militaire, and the 
Conseiller spécial en matière de sécurité (Special Security Advisor). 
Kabila and senior military officers also routinely by-passed the 
official chain of command by giving direct orders to commanders in 
the field. Some units, such as the elite Brigade Requin (Shark Brigade), 
were commanded almost directly by the presidency, and many officers 
complained that they would receive different orders from their direct 
commanders and from the presidency.66 Finally, despite a lack of legal 
provisions, Kabila retained under his personal control a 10,000–15,000 
strong presidential guard––the Groupe spécial de sécurité présidentielle (GSSP, 
Special Presidential Security Group), renamed in 2006 the Garde répub-
licaine (GR).67
These pockets of influence may not have given Kabila anything like full 
control but they did allow him to maintain dominance both within the 
army and within the country at large. While the east is swamped with 
rebel groups, few of these pose a direct threat to his regime. The similari-
ties with Mobutu are clear: Joseph Kabila has continued the tradition 
of control via informal networks and divide-and-rule strategies, playing 
65 Beginning in 1999, the RCD split into various factions, including the RCD-Kisangani/
Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML, RCD-Kisangani/Liberation Movement) and RCD-
National (RCD-N, RCD-National). Here we refer to the original RCD, still based in 
Goma.
66 Usalama Project Interviewees #825, Goma, 1 December 2012, #826, Kinshasa, 2 June 
2013, and #827, Kinshasa 4 April 2012.
67 Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Reform of the Army’, 25 January 2007, 
pp. 59–60.
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off competing networks against one another. In such a fragmented 
political and military context, however, these strategies are not always 
successful. There are three important reasons for this: as seen above, 
military leaders are strongly embedded in relatively independent political 
and economic networks, especially in the east. Secondly, the sheer multi-
tude of factions—with dozens of armed groups being absorbed into the 
FARDC—has created an even more fractured environment. Finally, the 
logic of military power sharing itself has complicated the management of 
the army, since those who have felt they were denied their due rewards 
have withdrawn or deserted.68
Fragmentation in the Congolese body politic is, of course, not limited 
to the army: it is the predominant feature both of the Congolese state 
apparatus and the political order at large. The president has not managed 
to create formal or informal structures that are sufficiently strong to 
overcome it. Kabila expressed his own frustration with this situation in 
an interview with the New York Times in 2009: ‘You don’t need a thousand 
people to transform a country. No, you need 3, 4, 10, 15 people with 
the necessary convictions, determined and resolute. Do I have those 15 
people? Probably 5, 6, 7, not yet 15.’69 This state of affairs has probably 
been accentuated by the president’s own style of leadership: centralizing 
decision making but sometimes taking months to make a decision.
Functionality and dysfunctionality in the FARDC
The Congolese army as it exists today has important characteristics that 
help explain why it is unable to cope with armed mobilization in the 
eastern DRC. What follows is an in-depth analysis of these characteris-
tics, designed to set the background before discussing potential reform 
policies.
68 Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, ‘Volatility’, pp. 577–80.
69 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘An Interview with Kabila’, The New York Times, 3 April 2009.
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Patronage networks
The FARDC should be seen as a collection of competing and overlapping 
patronage networks, which are both subservient to and conflict with the 
formal hierarchy. Within patron-client relations, loyalty, support, and 
the provision of certain services are exchanged for access to resources 
and protection. As one officer explained ‘In this army, you need to have 
an “umbrella,” someone who can look after you, secure promotions and 
lucrative deployments. Nothing works on merit alone.’70
Subordinates are obliged to pay regular amounts to superiors, often 
referred to as rapportage (‘bringing in’)—or, as many Congolese soldiers 
put it, ‘feeding the horse so the horse feeds you’.71 Rapportage works as 
an instrument of control: those failing to submit sufficient revenues 
are sent to so-called ‘drier zones’, with fewer opportunities to make 
money. The relationship between commander and subordinate is not 
one of unrestrained predation, but entails a kind of reciprocity. Just as 
subordinates are expected to deliver to their superiors, so they too are 
supposed to provide something in return: protection, advice, mitigation 
of punishments, promotion, leave, and training.
Officers and troops have other loyalties, too, as they can simultane-
ously be part of different patronage networks. These may be based on 
geography, ethnicity, education, or prior membership of an armed group 
or military unit. Thus some former FAZ officers assist each other, due to 
their common experiences under Mobutu—often contrasting their own 
professional training with that of the poorly trained post-1996 recruits. 
Since 2003, all commanders of the armed forces have been ex-FAZ 
70 Usalama Project interviewee #828, Kinshasa, 2 June 2013. 
71 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Ola Olsson, ‘Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic 
Activities within the Police Force in the DR Congo’, African Security 4/4 (2011), pp. 223–41.
48 THE NATIONAL ARMY & ARMED gROUPS IN EASTERN CONgO
officers.72 The head of the powerful presidential maison militaire, Major 
General Célestin Mbala, is also ex-FAZ, as are over half of the 11 regional 
military commanders. Those on the outside often lament the influence 
of the ex-FAZ. One such officer said: ‘We spilled our blood to overthrow 
Mobutu and his system, only to place the same people with the same 
culture of corruption and impunity at the head of the military.’73 At 
the same time, a common perception among ex-FAZ officers from the 
west is that the army is taken over by Swahili speakers from the east, 
particularly Katangans and Kivutians, and that they themselves are being 
marginalized.
A similar network, which has now begun to fray, regroups RCD 
officers from the east who were integrated into the army in 2003. By 
2011, more than half of the command positions in North and South Kivu 
were held by officers from this group.74 Some of the most prominent 
of these maintained their positions thanks to General Gabriel Amisi, 
former RCD officer and commander of the land forces between 2006–12. 
The view of one senior officer is representative of many colleagues: ‘He 
was given that position as part of the transition’s power-sharing deal, 
and was able to maintain it both by sharing money with the country’s 
leaders, and by promising to prevent ex-RCD officers from defecting. But 
instead, he often helped ex-RCD mutineers.’75
The example of the RCD shows that personal loyalties to former 
comrades, and the networks between political and military elites that 
were developed during the Congo Wars, have continued to shape military 
72 With the beginning of the transition in July 2003, Admiral Baudoin Liwanga became 
the Chief of Staff of the Congolese armed forces, the highest military position. He was 
succeeded by Major General Philemon Kisempia in 2004, who in turn handed over to 
Lieutenant General Dieudonné Kayembe in 2007. Lieutenant General Didier Etumba has 
been Chief of Staff since 2008.
73 Usalama Project Interviewee #830, Bukavu, 15 June 2013. 
74 Internal FARDC document on file with the Usalama Project; see also UN Security 
Council, S/2011/738, p. 82. 
75 Usalama Project interviewee #826, Kinshasa, 3 June 2013. 
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dynamics. This does not imply that war-era networks have remained 
entirely intact within the military: many, like the ex-MLC, have been 
diluted and absorbed, while others have been split, such as several 
ex-Mai Mai factions, parts of which were co-opted by the president, 
while others have deserted.
Divided loyalties have strongly affected combat performance, as 
evidenced by the FARDC’s mixed record against the M23. There are 
indications that the disastrous campaign against the rebels in November 
2012 could be attributed to deliberately counter-productive orders. Many 
officers complained that they were ordered by the high command not to 
pursue the M23, just as they gained the upper hand during the defence 
of Kibumba, 30 km north of Goma. One FARDC officer said: ‘Suddenly 
we received the order to stop. It didn’t make sense; it just gave them 
the chance to regroup and pull together a force that went on to take 
Goma.’76 The foreign-trained commando battalions were also ‘sabotaged’, 
according to one of their trainers: the 391st Battalion was deployed in 
the Virunga National Park without reconnaissance, got lost, and was 
ambushed by enemy forces.77 The 322nd Battalion was sent to Pinga to 
fight against the Mai-Mai Sheka, which is closely linked Colonel Etienne 
Bindu.78 The battalion was also forbidden to engage in active pursuit of 
the enemy and was subsequently ambushed.
Appointments based on connections rather than merit have further 
diminished the FARDC’s fighting capabilities. Subordinates lose respect 
for incompetent commanders, leading to insubordination and the refusal 
to obey orders. In addition, the disorganization created by parallel chains 
of command and the embezzlement of military funds and equipment 
have time and again undermined operational effectiveness. Troops often 
76 Johnny Hogg and Ed Stoddard, ‘Insight: Congo army debacle at Goma raises specter 
of betrayal’, Reuters, 10 December 2012.
77 Usalama Project Interviewee #824, Kinshasa, 1 June 2013.
78 Usalama Project Interviewee #824, Kinshasa, 1 June 2013; see also UN Security 
Council, S/2011/768, p. 61. 
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find themselves on the front line without food, ammunition, medical 
supplies, or adequate communications equipment. This was reflected in 
the recent military operations against the M23 before the fall of Goma in 
November 2012, when troops quickly ran out of supplies.
Revenue generation
Patronage networks in the FARDC reinforce the orientation of the army 
towards revenue-generation rather than defence. Positions at various 
levels are to a large extent obtained and kept through access to income-
generating activities. As a consequence, officers spend much of their time 
on a variety of business schemes. 
The military’s economic activities come in a variety of forms, and 
include the protection and taxation of the trade in minerals or other 
natural resources, such as hardwoods, charcoal, cannabis, wild animals 
or fish, and the sales of arms and ammunition.79 Illegal taxation also 
occurs at roadblocks along main transport routes, and at markets, border 
posts, harbours, and airports. 
Officers also generate income through less violent activities, such 
as real estate, import-export trade, the hotel and restaurant business, 
the transport sector, and agriculture, including livestock rearing.80 The 
scale of these commercial activities varies substantially. While some 
high-ranking officers run business empires, their subordinates engage 
in smaller-scale activities, such as owning a motorcycle for commercial 
transport or running kiosques (small shops). Furthermore, the activities 
of foot soldiers and their families mirror those of the wider Congolese 
survival economy, engaging for example in the production of palm oil 
or growing vegetables. Depending on how these economic activities are 
managed, and the degree of coercion they involve, they may be more or 
less detrimental to civilian security and livelihoods.
79 UN Security Council, S/2010/596, pp. 47–76.
80 UN Security Council, S/2012/843, p. 36; UN Security Council, S/2011/738, pp. 116, 
120–1, 129–30, and 149–51.
 THE CONgOLESE ARMY 51
This pursuit of profit does not always lead to unrestrained violence 
against civilians. Indeed, certain kinds of economic activities, such as 
shop keeping and petty trade, require collaboration with civilians: profits 
are greater in a climate of relative stability and security. Furthermore, 
the military needs civilians as buyers and sellers, but also for obtaining 
investment capital, licenses, and plots, arranging transport, and to influ-
ence administrative procedures and decisions. Since formal frameworks 
are weak, trust is a crucial asset for doing business in the DRC. Conse-
quently, depending on the nature of the economic activities, unrestrained 
predation can be detrimental to business interests.81
Finally, it should be noted that some civilians are complicit in violent 
forms of revenue generation. Politicians, businesspeople, and authorities 
at various levels profit from connections with armed groups and may use 
networks within the army to further their interests. It is, for instance, 
commonplace for businesspeople to use connections in the military to 
obtain reductions at customs, arrange for the protection of the transport 
of their goods, or intimidate economic competitors. The militarization 
of the economy, which feeds into armed group formation, is driven by 
armed and non-armed actors alike.82
The politics of military integration
In addition to creating incentives for insurgent violence, successive 
integration initiatives have further diminished an already weak army, in 
particular by undermining cohesion, both within and between units. This 
goes a long way to explaining the erratic functionality of the FARDC, 
as the bonds between soldiers and their peers, and between troops and 
their officers, are crucial for commitment, motivation, the enforcement of 
81 Judith Verweijen, ‘The Ambiguity of Militarization: The Complex Interaction 
Between the Congolese Armed Forces and Civilians in the Kivu Provinces, Eastern DR 
Congo’ (Utrecht: Utrecht University PhD thesis, forthcoming).
82 Judith Verweijen, ‘Military Business and the Business of the Military in the Kivus,’ 
Review of African Political Economy 40 (2013), pp. 67–82.
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norms, and performance in combat.83 Integration has often been carried 
out without proper retraining and without due attention to the composi-
tion of new units. The accelerated integration of the CNDP, PARECO, and 
a number of other armed groups in 2009 has been especially problematic 
in this respect. Some of the newly created brigades were dominated by a 
majority of up to 75 per cent from a single former armed group—leading 
to separate chains of command within the military, the undermining 
of central command, and a weaker government grip on the army in the 
Kivus.
The 2009 integration also accentuated existing ethnic tensions within 
the army.84 So-called ‘autochthonous’ troops, including ex-Mai-Mai and 
what are ironically named ‘ex-government’ troops (ex-FAZ and ex-FAC), 
believe that Kinyarwanda-speaking groups, in particular Tutsi, are system-
ically favoured in the distribution of ranks and positions. For instance, in 
September 2011, in the midst of an army reorganization process, officers 
in Bukavu drew up a ‘Memorandum of FARDC military officers who are 
victims of discrimination’. In the document, they denounced an alleged 
Rwandophone takeover of the FARDC, stating that the distribution of 
command positions in the new army structures followed ‘discriminatory 
and tribal-ethnic criteria’.85
For their part, Tutsi troops fear that they would be subject to perse-
cution and discrimination if they were to be deployed out of the Kivus. 
A former FARDC officer of Tutsi origin stated: ‘We are never safe in 
the army. Today they [FARDC soldiers] are your colleagues, but when 
something happens tomorrow, we are the first to get killed. We have 
seen this in 1998 in Kamina, in Kalemie, in Uvira, everywhere … and it 
can always happen again.’86 While some argue that this fear is exagger-
83 Guy L. Siebold, ‘The Essence of Military Group Cohesion’, Armed Forces & Society 33 
(2007), pp. 286–95.
84 UN Security Council, S/2011/738, pp. 89–90; 
85 UN Security Council, S/2011/738, pp. 89 and 262.
86 Cited in Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’
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ated, pointing to the several high-profile Tutsi officers who serve in the 
western DRC without difficulties, these feelings are nonetheless strong 
and contribute to mistrust.87
The politics of military integration has also provoked resentment 
among troops by fostering the distribution of ranks and positions to less 
educated integrated officers. Former FAZ as well as FAC soldiers consider 
themselves to be better trained than many of the newly integrated troops. 
As one ex-FAZ put it: 
The superiors have destroyed the work by integrating all these 
people. I tell you, they know nothing, nothing about work as 
a soldier. They don’t have training. But they still have their 
ranks, false ranks and you have to salute them. … I have served 
in the army for 20 years and I have training but I am still 
just a lieutenant! And I have to obey these losers who know 
nothing!88 
Such animosity towards commanders undermines the latter’s control 
over their subordinates.
Control and accountability
Both the workings of patronage and the low levels of trust in and respect 
for commanders seriously undermine control and accountability in the 
Congolese army. As elsewhere, commanders with a weak and contested 
position tend to be less inclined to punish troops, as this can easily 
87 These include General Obed Rwibasira (Commander of the 5th Military Region, 
Kasaï-Occidental), General Mustapha Mukiza (commander of the military base at Kitona 
in Bas-Congo) and General Malik Kijege (Inspector-General, previously charged with 
logistics at the General Staff of the FARDC in Kinshasa).
88 Maria Eriksson Baaz, ‘The Price for Peace? Military Integration and Continued 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, Swedish National Defence 
College, February 2011, p. 14.
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provoke a mutiny.89 Commanders may also experience difficulties in 
disciplining troops that are protected by powerful patrons. After the 2009 
integration of the CNDP, non-CNDP commanders with a large propor-
tion of CNDP troops in their units had limited room to manoeuvre. As 
one brigade commander explained: ‘When I want to discipline them 
[ex-CNDP troops], I first need to contact their old commanders. I cannot 
do anything without their approval, otherwise I will run into trouble.’90
Control over troops is further hampered by limited transport and 
communication facilities, especially in the vast rural areas, which are 
barely accessible by road and often lack cellular phone coverage. Only 
brigade or regimental commanders have satellite phones, and two-way 
radios, whose reach is anyway limited, are not always distributed below 
company level. This means that squad and platoon commanders can only 
communicate with their superiors by sending messengers on foot over 
great distances, leading to critical delays. But problems of supervision 
and control also occur in urban zones, where the lack of barracks forces 
troops to disperse in civilian neighbourhoods.
The ability of FARDC commanders to hold their troops to account is 
thus limited by a range of contextual factors. This undermines simplistic 
characterisations of commanders as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or ‘agents of 
change’ versus ‘spoilers’, which are sometimes heard among donors. The 
behaviour of a commander can differ profoundly depending on where he 
is deployed, his position in patronage networks, and the composition of 
his unit.
89 David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance during the Vietnam War (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 1975); Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon 
of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond (London and New York: 
Zed Books, 2013).
90 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘La ‘mère des armées’ n’est pas encore 
morte: Des pratiques de justice (in)formelle dans les Forces armées de la République 
démocratique du Congo’, Politique africaine 1/129 (2013), p. 57.
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Working and living conditions
As with other state officials in the DRC, the living and working condi-
tions of FARDC rank-and-file and their families are deplorable. While 
improvements have been made in both the regularity of payments and 
the salary level, the present official income of around USD 70 a month 
for ordinary troops is far from enough to maintain even a small family. 
As access to social services and basic necessities is weak or non-existent, 
salaries have to cover a range of other expenses, such as housing and 
household items, medical bills, food, schooling for children, and trans-
port during rotations or when going on leave. FARDC soldiers have no 
right to paid leave and obtaining permission for leave is generally very 
difficult, especially for units permanently deployed in combat operations. 
It is not uncommon––particularly in operational zones––to meet soldiers 
who have not seen their families for over 10 years, especially when the 
latter are in the western part of the country. Clearly, this creates high 
levels of psychological stress.
The lack of leave and the poor wages are among the main reasons for 
army wives to follow their husbands around, ending up living in impro-
vised shelters in military camps, often with small children. In addition to 
the poor living conditions, this is highly insecure, as it renders military 
families vulnerable to attacks by armed groups. Furthermore, in opera-
tional zones where troops are rapidly rotated, the poorest among the 
army wives frequently have to travel on foot over vast distances to follow 
their husbands. Rotations are also an important source of poverty. As one 
wife of a soldier explained, ‘If you don’t have a ticket for the rotation, 
you sell your kitchen pots. If you are hungry, you sell off the rest. You 
end up with nothing.’91 Moreover, rotations make it difficult for military 
spouses to sustain agricultural activities or ensure a continuous educa-
tion for their children.
91 Steven van Damme and Judith Verweijen, ‘In Search of an Army. How the FARDC 
Can Improve Civilians’ Safety’, Oxfam (unpublished), p. 26.
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While service conditions are difficult for all soldiers, they are particu-
larly tough for personnel militaire féminin (PMF, Female Military Personnel), 
especially in operational zones. The number of women serving in the 
Congolese army is low and has decreased since they first entered in 
the beginning of the 1960s to the current rate of around two per cent. 
While there are a number of reasons for this––including discrimination 
in training and the allocation of ranks and positions, and gender norms 
according to which military work is seen as unsuitable for women––the 
poor living situations and the lack of child care also play a role.92 Women 
soldiers have to choose between bringing young children on deployment 
or leaving them at home to be cared for by family members, implying (as 
for their male colleagues) rarely seeing them. In many cases, they choose 
to bring their children along, which puts the latter in danger and hinders 
their own military duties, thus holding them back in their careers. A 
positive step in terms of gender equality efforts was the promotion of the 
first three women to the rank of general in July 2013. However, whether 
this will translate into increased influence is another matter: in the 
FARDC, high rank is no guarantee of actual power.
Aside from insufficient material compensation, rewards such as status 
and recognition for success are also lacking in the FARDC. These are 
important since they contribute to pride in the profession and foster 
good relations with civilians. As one soldier put it: ‘Why should I fight 
and risk my life? I get nothing. No money. And not even honour. The 
civilians despise us.’93 The feeling of being looked down on by civilians is 
widespread among ordinary troops, who often report being called names 
such as losers, beggars, and faux têtes (someone who does not pay for 
92 Maira Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘Fearless Fighters and Submissive Wives: 
Negotiating Identity among Women Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)’, Armed Forces and 
Society, 22 February 2013.
93 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘The Complexity of Violence: A critical analysis 
of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, Sida/Nordic Africa 
Institute, 2010, p. 27.
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him/herself). 94 This indicates that the image of the military in civilian 
eyes is not only influenced by the abuses perpetrated by the army but 
also by low social status. An officer put it this way: ‘The civilians don’t 
respect us, because we don’t have anything. We have to beg from them, 
so they see us as losers. They call us bad names … So sometimes you 
just have to show them.’95 While one cannot assume that there is a direct 
correlation between feelings of being disrespected and violence, these 
sentiments are certainly not conducive to good relations with civilians.
Such poor conditions of service are rarely shared by senior commanders, 
especially those with powerful networks. There is a conspicuous wealth 
gap between ordinary troops, condemned to the hardships of poverty, 
and their privileged commanders, adding to a strong feeling of injustice 
in the ranks. As one soldier expressed it: ‘So tell me, how can we be 
disciplined? They all cheat us. Our superiors cheat us. … They send 
their children to Europe but our children die.’96 While any effective army 
reform has to start from the top, it will need to translate into concrete 
improvements for troops on the ground. This is not only crucial for 
improving combat performance, but also for fostering discipline, which 
are both preconditions for transforming the FARDC into a military that 
reduces, rather than fosters, violent conflict in the eastern DRC.
94 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers 
in the Congo (DRC)’, Journal of Modern African Studies 46/1 (2008), pp. 57–86. 
95 Eriksson Baaz and Stern, Complexity of Violence, p. 28.
96 Eriksson Baaz and Stern, ‘Making Sense of Violence’.
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4. The absence of a comprehensive 
strategy for tackling insecurity
The previous chapters on the complex context of armed mobilization, 
ranging from the violent competition between elites to the malfunctioning 
of the FARDC, suggest that the current approach to peace building and 
stabilization needs to be rethought. The Congolese government, as well 
as its international partners, have only partially addressed the root causes 
of the eastern DRC’s instability. This chapter sketches recent initiatives 
aimed at reducing armed group activity, and reforming the army, arguing 
that both require a comprehensive political strategy. 
The UN and international donors: Shunning  
political engagement
The way policy in the DRC is made and implemented is as complex 
as armed mobilization itself. Competing power networks in Kinshasa 
hamper the decision-making processes of the government, as does the 
state’s weak grip over its army and administration. International donors 
are no less divided than the Congolese government. By channelling 
money to various state and non-state actors at different levels without 
an overarching strategy, donor interventions have tended to reproduce 
rather than diminish fragmentation.
Divisions between donors have deepened since the transition. Presi-
dent Kabila, strengthened by his new democratic mandate, tried to reduce 
foreign influence in internal policy. This coincided with waning interest 
from donors after the 2006 elections, in which they had invested enormous 
resources. These elections reinforced the DRC’s perceived post-conflict 
status, which had a real impact on UN and donor engagement.97 This was 
97 Séverine Autesserre, ‘Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and 
International Intervention’, International Organization 63 (2009), pp. 249–80.
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reflected, among other areas, in armed groups being consistently labelled 
as ‘residual’ or as réfractaires au brassage (refusing army integration), 
misrepresenting the magnitude of the challenge posed by persistent 
armed mobilization. Deprived of a consistent policy for dealing with this 
challenge, the UN peacekeeping mission backed the often ill-disciplined 
FARDC in its erratic counterinsurgency efforts.
This approach, guided by a technocratic interpretation of violence as a 
law-and-order problem linked to weak state institutions, was exemplified 
in the transformation of the UN peacekeeping mission into a stabilization 
mission in 2010. This change underestimated the degree to which armed 
groups are linked to competition between elites, as well as the impor-
tance of local tensions. The new stance, a confluence of Kinshasa’s desire 
for greater independence and donors’ technocratic focus, did not provide 
the tools to deal with the political factors driving armed group formation.
The previous International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy 
(ISSS), a donor programme designed to support the Congolese govern-
ment’s Programme de stabilisation et de reconstruction des zones sortant des 
conflits armés (STAREC, Stabilization and Reconstruction Programme for 
War-affected Areas), is an illustration of this apolitical approach. The 
ISSSS was designed to back up the March 2009 peace deal between the 
Congolese government and armed groups with the aim of reinforcing the 
presence of the state, especially its justice, security, and administrative 
agencies. But the programme underestimated the instability of some of 
the targeted areas and did little to address the dynamics underlying local 
governance, focusing on the construction of infrastructure instead. So 
roads, police stations and court buildings were built without provision 
as to how these were going to be staffed, managed, or secured by the 
national institutions of which they formed a part, and without paying 
much attention to political and military developments in the targeted 
zones.98
98 Samuel Dixon, ‘For me, but without me, is against me’: Why Efforts to Stabilise the 
Democratic Republic of Congo Are Not Working’, Oxfam Lobby Briefing, 4 July 2012.
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Militarily, the UN peacekeeping mission has adopted a reactive 
approach to armed groups, only supporting offensive operations by the 
FARDC and responding to emergencies. Except for a brief experiment 
between 2005–7 by the eastern division of the Mission de l’Organisation 
des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC, United 
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), as the UN 
mission was called up to 2010, a more robust stance towards armed 
groups, aiming at forced disarmament, has been rare.99 Instead, the 
UN tacitly accepted or actively endorsed the policies of the Kinshasa 
government, including strategies of military integration that were based 
on opaque deals and controversial military decisions. The terms of the 
January 2009 deal between the governments in Kinshasa and Kigali, 
for example, were decided by negotiators behind closed doors: the UN 
mission was side-lined both in the negotiations and in the subsequent 
joint military operations against the FDLR.100
The recent deployment of the FIB within the Mission de l’Organisation 
des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de la République démocratique du Congo 
(MONUSCO, United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) is a renewed attempt at robust peacekeeping. 
The FIB could potentially restore MONUSCO’s credibility, which was 
heavily dented by the fall of Goma in November 2012, and could help 
rescue the FARDC from the vicious cycle of endless negotiations with 
armed groups. However, in addition to concerns about civilian protection 
and humanitarian access, there are questions concerning the scope and 
longer-term impact of the FIB’s deployment.
The new initiative is not formally linked to any wider political strategy 
for dealing with armed groups; there are no clear follow-up measures, nor 
is there a new demobilization plan, nor any new provision for security 
99 Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, ‘The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, 
the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations’, Henry L. Stimson Center, 
Washington DC, 2006, pp. 155–78.
100 ICG, ‘Congo: No Stability’, pp. 4–5.
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sector reform.101 There is a lack of connection with the various political 
processes in the country that are critical to the success of the FIB: political 
developments in Kinshasa, the peace-talks between M23 and the Kinshasa 
government (led by the International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region in Kampala), and the process set in motion by the UN-brokered 
Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and the Region (the Framework Agreement) signed by 11 
African nations on 24 February 2013. This fragmentation is indicative 
of the lack of an overarching vision among donors and the political 
engagement needed to develop and implement it. 
Erratic government policies and impunity
The Congolese government’s policies vis-à-vis armed groups have been 
erratic, rarely using political and military instruments in a coordinated 
manner. Kinshasa’s main tactic has been to integrate them into the 
military. But integration is often based on negotiations with individual 
armed groups, and has rarely been part of a wider political process aiming 
to address the roots of violent elite competition or local conflicts. Hence 
it has usually failed to bind integrated factions either into the state 
apparatus or into the presidential patronage network, and those who 
drop out have not hesitated to remobilize. 
Sustained military pressure to weaken armed groups has been infre-
quent and counterproductive. Some groups have built up far-reaching 
political and economic control over their local fiefdoms, and are reluctant 
to relinquish this power. In such cases, a decision on whether to lay 
down arms boils down to a calculation of whether the potential pay-off 
outweighs the status quo.
Political and judicial pressure on armed groups and supporting 
elite networks has been minimal. Prosecutions or other sanctions for 
101 General-Major (Ret.) Patrick Cammaert and Fiona Blyth, ‘The UN Intervention 
Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, International Peace Institute, New 
York/ Vienna, July 2013.
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deserters, and for political and military elites supporting armed groups 
are uncommon. While political leaders have occasionally been arrested 
on the grounds of collaborating with insurgent networks, arrests have 
been highly selective, only targeting those suspected of being linked to 
networks that are seen as a direct threat to the government, such as the 
M23. Trials have rarely followed; and when these have taken place they 
have been publicized only in cases when the accused party was perceived 
as a direct threat to the government.102
The same impunity applies to FARDC officers involved in the arms 
trade or in support to armed groups. The UN Group of Experts has exten-
sively documented such support, but the Congolese authorities have 
rarely acted on this information by initiating their own investigations. 
Only when deemed politically expedient, as was the case with General 
Gabriel Amisi, have such allegations prompted action.103
In sum, political and military elites in the eastern DRC have supported 
armed groups almost entirely with impunity, even when such support 
has been an open secret.
Overcoming local conflicts and grievances
As outlined in this and previous Usalama Project reports, local conflict 
dynamics and grievances—including tensions related to land, local 
authority and identity—are an important factor in the formation of 
armed groups. While these issues have often been termed as ‘local’, since 
they play out at the community level, they usually also have important 
102 This was the case with the insurgent group related to retired General Benoît-Faustin 
Munene, against which a mass trial took place in Bas Congo at the start of 2011; Radio 
France International, ‘Général à la retraite, Faustin Munene condamné à perpétuité’, 25 
March 2011.
103 One of the reasons cited for Amisi’s removal in November 2011 was his involvement 
in arms trade to armed groups; UN Security Council, S/2011/738, p. 62; also Johnny Hogg, 
‘DR Congo General Sold Arms to Rebel Groups: U.N. Report’, Reuters, 21 November 
2012.
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national dimensions, being shaped by national legislation and regulatory 
frameworks. 
Land ownership and legislation
Land conflicts are driven by various factors, including a multiplicity of 
overlapping and conflicting regulatory frameworks, weak arbitration 
mechanisms, conflicting land use, and competition over land between 
established, (putative) immigrant and displaced populations. It has been 
widely recognized that current land legislation is inadequate, and the 
Congolese government has announced a revision of the 1973 land law as 
part of a wider process of participatory land reform. While the outcomes 
of this slowly moving process are still uncertain, Kinshasa appears to 
have a preference for abolishing the customary tenure that prevails in 
many rural areas, thereby eradicating the role of customary chiefs in 
land governance. This role has often been difficult, with chiefs selling 
off communally owned land with little regard for existing tenure.104 Yet 
it is far from certain that the introduction of a formalized land market, 
in which farmers own individual or communal legal titles, would signif-
icantly reduce conflicts and improve tenure security for small-scale 
farmers.
Local governance reform 
The eastern DRC is mired in a crisis of local governance. One of the 
roots of this crisis is the institution of customary authority. While it is 
a cornerstone of existing governance arrangements, especially in areas 
where government authorities are absent or have little power and legiti-
macy, customary chiefs are often at the centre of local conflicts.105 Their 
position may be disputed by family members, their community’s right to 
104 Frank van Acker, ‘La «pembénisation» du Haut-Kivu: Opportunisme et Droits 
Fonciers Revisités,’ in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 1998–1999 (eds. Stefaan Marysse 
and Filip Reyntjens) (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1999), pp. 201–36.
105 Koen Vlassenroot and Hans Romkema, Local Governance & Leadership in Eastern DRC 
(The Hague: Oxfam Novib, 2007).
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rule may be contested by another, or they may be involved in competition 
with government-appointed authorities.
The current decentralization process, which was intended to address 
this issue, is proceeding erratically, as essential parts of the required 
legal and institutional framework have not yet been implemented. There 
are also procedural ambiguities, which involve institutional and legal 
uncertainties and overlaps. Local elections scheduled for 2008 have still 
not been held and it is uncertain when they will take place.106
Local elections are designed to lead to the creation of new representa-
tive councils, which can hold local chiefs to account. This presents both 
opportunities and challenges for finding a way out of the current crisis 
of local governance. Among the dangers is the possibility that elections 
would ignite inter-community tensions, with politicians turning to ethnic 
rhetoric to rally support, and as local elites are threatened in areas where 
groups other than those linked to the chief form the majority. The newly 
elected councils could also promote division, pitting those linked to the 
patronage network of customary chiefs against others.
On the other hand, increased collaboration between representatives 
of different communities within locally elected councils could foster 
social cohesion, while such councils could function as platforms in which 
communal disputes are addressed and regulated. Additionally, they have 
the potential to control and counterbalance the power of customary 
chiefs.
Accountability and reconciliation
Many local conflicts over land and local governance occur between 
different ethnic communities. Ethnically based violence since the 1990s 
has deepened mutual mistrust. With politicians and armed groups 
capitalizing on these animosities, reconciliation and social cohesion are 
106 Pierre Englebert, ‘Incertitude, autonomie et parasitisme: les entités territoriales 
décentralisées et l’état en République Démocratique du Congo’, Politique Africaine 125 
(2010), pp. 169–88.
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crucial to reducing armed mobilization. One of the issues to be addressed 
is accountability for past abuses.
To date, the Congolese government has done little to pursue reconcili-
ation and transitional justice. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
demanded by the Global and Inclusive Agreement failed to have an 
impact during its brief 2004–6 tenure, and the government has only 
recently begun to consider implementing recommendations made by 
the UN Mapping Report published in 2010.107 This report documents the 
most serious human rights violations that took place in Congolese terri-
tory between March 1993 and June 2003. It outlines a number of possible 
policy responses including the creation of a special mixed chamber, made 
up of international and national personnel, organized within the Congo-
lese civilian judicial system. This is a welcome proposal that has been 
endorsed by international human rights organizations and for which 
legislation is currently pending.108 The prosecution of individual perpe-
trators, however, will not help inter-community reconciliation without 
a more comprehensive longer-term, and local process.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
Poor demobilization in itself did not trigger any of the major post-2003 
cycles of violence, but it facilitated recruitment. In places such as Bunya-
kiri and Fizi, a large number of current rebel fighters have been through 
demobilization programmes, only to be re-recruited by rebel groups. 
Many found no alternative livelihood. Their former leaders pressured 
107 UNOHCHR, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003. Report of the Mapping 
Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003’, August 2010.
108 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Tackling Impunity in Congo: Meaningful Follow-
up to the UN Mapping Report: A Mixed Chamber and Other Accountability Measures, 
1 October 2010; HRW, ‘Comments on the second version of the Draft Legislation to 
Establish Specialized Chambers within the Congolese Judicial System for the Prosecution 
of Grave International Crimes’, February 2011.
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them to re-join, or they were prompted to do so by continuing insecurity 
in their home areas. 
Demobilization was proposed as one of the cornerstones of the peace 
process in the DRC, aimed at returning 150,000 combatants to civilian 
life.109 Starting in 2004 in Ituri, various national structures were set 
up for the purposes of demobilization, with the Commission nationale 
de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion (CONADER, National Disar-
mament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Commission) becoming the 
main vehicle. Eventually, CONADER demobilized 132,367 combatants—
including 30,219 children—by the time it was closed in 2008.
Other programmes followed, including those linked to the 2008 Goma 
peace process and STAREC, but they were beset with controversy and 
technical obstacles. The reintegration stage was especially difficult: it 
targeted individual combatants and in the communities to which they 
returned the perception tended to be that those who took up arms were 
rewarded financially and given vocational training. This complicated 
reconciliation efforts.110
While most of the 100,000 adults who went through the programme 
received a USD 360 allowance (USD 60 for transport home, then USD 
25 disbursed monthly for a year), only around half initially benefitted 
from projects that could provide them new livelihoods such as educa-
tion, training, animal husbandry, or microcredit facilities.111 In part, this 
was because the authorities had not budgeted well: most of the money 
was spent on transporting combatants––USD 20 million, a tenth of the 
entire budget. Another part of the problem was embezzlement and the 
mismanagement of funds. In December 2006, just over a year after the 
109 World Bank, ‘Technical Annex for a Proposed Grant of $100 Million to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration 
Project,’ 3 May 2004, p. 11.
110 Hans Rouw and Rens Willems, ‘Connecting Community Security and DDR: 
Experiences from Eastern DRC’, Peace, Security and Development Network, 2010.
111 Multicountry Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Fact Sheet, March 2009.
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demobilization programme began, the World Bank suspended funding 
pending an audit until 2008.
Reintegration programmes were rarely effective in creating long-
term livelihoods for demobilized soldiers. In some places in the Kivus, 
for example, bicycles and sewing machines were distributed, but no 
business training was provided. Some recipients sold the equipment.112 
In Bunyakiri, several ex-combatants reported that they had purchased 
motorcycles and a generator-powered cassava mill, but they had fallen 
out with each other over the management of the equipment and the 
projects had fallen apart.113 In Kamituga in Mwenga territory, the local 
CONADER contractor distributed seeds that were inappropriate to the 
local soil, in Masisi mechanics were trained but given no seed-money to 
start a business. 114
Reinsertion packages are, in any case, no guarantee of demobiliza-
tion. DDR programmes have a limited influence on the life trajectory 
of former combatants, oriented as they are towards short-term material 
benefits rather than the long term. Many demobilized combatants remain 
linked to former armed group networks, whose command and control 
structures often remain partly intact.115 
In this respect, the on-going violence in the eastern DRC has under-
mined DDR efforts. As a UN official commented: ‘You cannot do 
demobilization while people are fighting. You send fighters home while 
their villages are under attack––you can imagine what will happen.’116 
Similarly, a senior Congolese army officer commented: ‘If you demobilise 
one group without dealing with neighbouring groups, it will never work.’117 
112 Usalama Project Interviewees #819, Goma, 29 March 2013, and #840, Mwenga, 3 May 
2013.
113 Usalama Project Interviewee #829, Bunyakiri, 9 April 2013
114 Usalama Project Interviewee #838, Kamituga, 1 May 2013.
115 Joanne Richards, ‘Demobilization in the DRC. Armed Groups and the Role of 
Organizational Control, Armed Actors’, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, April 2013.
116 Usalama Project interviewee #810, Goma, 7 March 2013. 
117 Usalama Project Interviewee #811, Bukavu, 12 June 2013. 
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So the government’s piecemeal approach to armed groups—demobilizing 
some while continuing to fight others—has formed a major obstacle to 
the success of DDR programmes. This erratic policy vis-à-vis armed 
groups has also importantly hampered efforts at army reform.
Army Reform
There are many factors slowing down reform of the defence sector in the 
DRC. One of these is the almost incessant military activity in the east. A 
senior security official commented: ‘You can’t do army reform while you 
fight, and especially when you hand all these command positions over 
to former militiamen.’118 Another official put it this way: ‘After all this 
integration, we have all sorts of people in the army now. Most of them 
with no sense of what it means to be a soldier. We are trying to create a 
national army in this mess. And we are in the midst of continuing war. 
Defence reform while we’re at war—what can you expect?’119
Reforms have also been undercut by repeated waves of armed group 
integration, which have undermined cohesion and combat performance. 
Furthermore, integration has led to the constant reorganization of units, 
which has contributed to the undoing of earlier reform efforts. While 
certainly an incomplete process, several of the brigades established 
by the brassage experience of 2004–8 were reasonably well integrated, 
as loyalties to previous armed groups were gradually weakened. By 
contrast, subsequent integration efforts, particularly the 2009 endeavour, 
largely undermined this fragile cohesion, accentuating old divisions and 
reinforcing parallel chains of command.
The army reform process has also been hampered by abortive reform 
plans that are revised or scrapped whenever a new army commander or 
minister of defence arrives. In July 2007, the government briefed donors 
118 Usalama Project interviewee #812, Kinshasa, 21 June 2013.
119 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘Willing reform? An analysis of defence 
reform initiatives in the DRC’, in Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and 
Governance (ed. Arne Bigsten) (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 204.
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on its plans to restructure the army and form a rapid response force to 
replace MONUC within two years. The ambitious plan also aimed at 
creating a ‘developmental army’ involved in food production and infra-
structure rehabilitation. In February 2008, this was formalized under 
the Plan directeur global de la réforme de l’armée (Global Directive for Army 
Reform), which laid out three phases of reforms between 2008–20. These 
stipulated first the creation of brigades to deal with internal security 
problems––the so-called forces de couverture (covering forces)––then rapid 
reaction forces, and finally the principal defence forces, encompassing 
the artillery and mechanized units necessary to fend off attacks from 
neighbouring countries.
Lack of funds forced the government to backpedal on this ambitious 
plan. After the minister of defence and the head of the armed forces 
were changed in late 2008, a Plan révisé de la réforme de l’armée (Revised 
Army Reform Plan) was released, retaining the basic elements of the 
previous proposal, but filling in details and reducing the cost. This plan 
aimed at a self-financing army reform, and brought down the costs to 
USD 686 million between 2009–25. Furthermore, it put an emphasis on 
development of the individual soldier: improving conditions and welfare, 
making recruitment more demanding, and retraining a corps of 145,000 
personnel.
In early 2013, a new army reform plan began making the rounds in 
Kinshasa. This was known as the Moya Plan, after General Jean-Pierre 
Moya, who helped to draft it. The new plan, which was backed by the 
new Minister of Defence Ntambo Luba, keeps many of the features of 
previous proposals, but is also influenced by the recent escalation of 
conflict in the Kivus. Thus it includes a 15-month ‘Sub-Plan for Training 
During War’. The theoretical detail is impressive, but implementation 
will require substantial donor resources.
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Fragmented donor coordination
A host of donors are engaged in defence reform efforts in the DRC. These 
include the European Union,120 MONUSCO, the United States, China, 
Belgium, France, Angola, and South Africa. Each has been engaged 
mainly in bilateral programmes, though there has been some attempt 
at coordination. The government in Kinshasa itself prefers to maintain 
these bilateral ties, an approach justified by an appeal to national security 
interests. Donors differ in their response to this: China and African states 
tend to support the Congolese position, emphasizing the sovereignty 
issue, while western donors, suspecting a lack of political will to engage 
in real reform, fear that Kinshasa is pitting donor against donor to profit 
from external engagement as much as possible.
The same western donors that champion coordination have often 
themselves been engaged in fierce competition, vying for visibility and 
competing for influence. This has contributed to a questioning of their 
motives by some Congolese, who already tend to attribute donor interest 
in defence reform (as in other areas of intervention) to a desire for a 
share of the DRC’s natural resources. As one senior army officer argued: 
‘All minerals that are found elsewhere can be found here. The Congo 
is systematically used by all countries. All people who come here, the 
majority do not come to help, but to exploit’.121
Such beliefs, shaped by a long history of colonial and postcolonial 
occupation and interference, are genuinely held. And Congolese have 
good reason to ask why, if donors truly want coordination, they do 
not coordinate themselves. As one army officer concluded: ‘All these 
countries, do they agree? Do they really want coordination? If so, they 
should first harmonize their own interests’.122
120 EU funds are channeled through the Mission de conseil et d’assistance de l’Union 
Européenne en matière de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en République démocratique du Congo 
(EUSEC, EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Sector Reform in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), whose mandate is due to end in September 2014.
121 Eriksson Baaz and Stern, ‘Willing reform?’, p. 204.
122 Eriksson Baaz and Stern ‘Willing reform?’, p. 206.
 THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEgY 71
Perhaps more harmful than policy fragmentation among donors has 
been the apolitical stance they have taken towards the integration of 
armed groups into the army. While donors’ ability to influence Congo-
lese government policy on integration is limited, they have made few 
efforts to influence the process adopting either a wait-and-see attitude or 
championing integration, as was the case with the 23 March 2009 deal.123 
Yet the disastrous impact of this integration exercise and the subsequent 
military operations and its deleterious effect on army reform is clear.
Finally, donors’ financial commitments to army reform have rarely 
matched their rhetoric. Defence reform receives comparatively little 
international aid. Between 2006–10, just over 1 per cent (USD 84.79 
million) of total aid––excluding debt relief and bilateral military assis-
tance––was spent directly on the security sector as a whole.124 Moreover, 
while most bilateral interventions take the form of training, only approxi-
mately six per cent of FARDC troops have received specialized training 
by or under the supervision of foreign military personnel since 2007.125
123 Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, Between Integration and Disintegration, p. 30–2.
124 ASADHO et al., ‘The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security 
Sector Reform’, 16 April 2012, p. 3.
125 van Damme and Verweijen, ‘In Search of an Army’, p. 10.
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5. Policy considerations
The challenges of ridding the eastern DRC of armed mobilization are 
formidable; the roots of mobilization are many; the national and inter-
national policy environments are less than hospitable. Discussions with 
Congolese, military and civilian, at local and governmental level, and with 
international specialists suggests that a new and better-informed overall 
strategy is needed if there is to be any chance of success. This strategy 
should aim to harmonize political and military approaches; it should 
link short-term negotiations with parties to the conflict to longer-term 
institutional reforms, including reform of the armed forces of the DRC. 
The following considerations are offered as the basis for such a strategy.
Tackling armed mobilization
One of the key causes of armed mobilization is the militarization of polit-
ical and economic competition between regional, national and provincial 
elites. An effective strategy for dealing with armed groups should there-
fore address the incentives that drive elites to turn to violence. And it 
should take issue with the climate of impunity surrounding support to 
armed groups.
Dealing with armed groups
The multitude of armed groups active in the eastern Congo, and the 
limited means available to deal with them, means that they cannot be 
tackled all at once, but have, of necessity, to be dealt with in order of 
importance. Many Mai-Mai groups have little influence outside their 
own communities of origin, and therefore have little capacity to promote 
broader destabilization. By contrast, other groups have a pronounced 
regional dimension, either receiving support from neighbouring 
countries, as in the case of the M23, or rebelling against them such as the 
FDLR, ADF and FNL. These groups act as conflict-multipliers, making 
alliances with other armed groups, or provoking mobilization of such 
groups in self-defence.
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The M23 and its predecessor, the CNDP, are at the heart of the escala-
tion of conflict in the Kivus since 2004. To strike a deal to dismantle 
the M23, the Congolese government will have to look beyond negotia-
tions with the rebels to direct talks with the Rwandan government. 
The 23 March 2009 peace deal between the Congolese government and 
the CNDP left chains of command intact and gave blanket amnesties 
to human rights offenders. This effectively subverted the agreement. 
To avoid a repetition of this, donors will need to increase pressure on 
Rwanda.
Donor pressure is also needed to find solutions to other rebellions, in 
particular the foreign-led groups, many of which have become strongly 
embedded in their local environment in the DRC, making it necessary to 
have a corresponding multi-level response.126 Strategies by the Congolese 
government, its neighbours and international partners should be coordi-
nated with and complemented by the actions of the local communities 
in whose midst these rebel groups reside. This also applies to potential 
operations by the newly deployed UN intervention brigade, the FIB. It 
needs both to take account of local dynamics and be connected to a wider 
strategy involving the Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian governments.
Tackling violent elite competition
To tackle the involvement of Congolese elites in militia activity, the Congo-
lese government will need to impose sanctions on the support networks 
of rebel organizations, including politicians and army commanders who 
are often key figures in these networks. There is an opportunity also 
for the government to work with its international partners to undercut 
the resource bases of armed groups by improving the formalization and 
regulation of trade and the natural resources sector. The involvement of 
elites in neighbouring countries with armed groups in the DRC is also 
126 Hans Romkema, ‘Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and 
Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Cases 
of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU’, MDRP, June 2007.
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an area where informed involvement on the part of international donors 
could help: by transforming these violent relationships into regional 
economic collaboration.
Putting sanctions on support networks requires uncovering them first. 
This is no easy task. They are often part of wider regional and global 
networks of organized crime engaged in racketeering and smuggling 
of arms and other commodities. Apart from the work of the UN Group 
of Experts, there is little systematic effort to document and monitor 
armed groups and their support networks. This is another area where 
donor involvement could improve public information by increasing 
material and diplomatic support to researchers, journalists and UN and 
non-government organizations that are involved in investigating and 
analysing armed group activity.
Managing military integration
The continued integration of armed groups, often led by army deserters, 
into the armed forces has, paradoxically, become an important incentive 
for armed mobilization by other groups. All observers agree that this 
harmful policy needs to be progressively abandoned, with armed groups 
demobilized and returned to civilian life. And while military integration 
continues, it has to be drastically reformed. It will avoid that armed group 
leaders drop out if the integration processes are made more transparent, 
with clear timelines and cut-off dates, stricter disarmament conditions, 
and credible control mechanisms. This necessitates neutral control and 
verification functions in the zones formerly controlled by integrating 
armed groups. UN military observers could play a useful role here.
An army that is in conflict with itself is unlikely to have a positive 
impact on conflict dynamics in the eastern DRC. Therefore future 
military integration processes will also need to address the issue of 
retraining and redeployment of troops, the unbalanced composition of 
units, and the distribution of ranks and positions without regard for 
merit. This is particularly important for avoiding fuelling identity-based 
tensions within the military. Even without further integration, these 
tensions have to be mitigated, as they not only undermine cohesion, but 
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also tend to have spin-off effects in the civilian environment where the 
military is deployed. 
Finally, impunity remains a crucial issue in managing armed group 
integration and in reforming the FARDC. Previous integration processes 
have included neither prosecution nor vetting. This has been especially 
problematic for rebels with senior ranks, who have set an example of 
impunity to those lower down the chain. Future integration efforts 
cannot avoid the question of responsibility for past abuses.127
Addressing local conflicts and grievances
Local conflicts and grievances alone do not generate mobilization on the 
part of armed groups, but they are a key ingredient. The local dimension 
is of key importance in fostering stability in the longer term.
Reducing land conflicts
The reform of land governance is crucial to the longer-term stabilization 
of the eastern DRC, but wrongly or hastily implemented reforms could 
have counter-productive effects. A strategy that combines government 
and local involvement is called for. The introduction of any new legisla-
tion should be complemented with wider governance and administrative 
reforms to ensure that inhabitants of remote areas have equal access to 
land titles and arbitration mechanisms. Such comprehensive reforms 
will be a long-term process. In the shorter term efforts should focus on 
reinforcing dispute-resolution and arbitration mechanisms, extending 
the scope of such mechanisms to the communal dimensions of land 
conflicts. 128
127 For more detailed recommendations on future army integration processes, see 
Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, ‘Between Integration and Disintegration’, p. 22–9
128 Koen Vlassenroot, Land Issues and Conflict in Eastern DRC (New York: Social Science 
Research Council, 2013).
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Improving local governance
Local elections are stipulated by the constitution and the government 
should honour this commitment while moving to mitigate its risks. 
It should monitor communal tensions, before, during and after the 
elections, and rein in local politicians who turn to ethnic mobilization. 
International donors, for their part, should invest in voter education 
and election monitoring by local civil society organizations. At the same 
time, they should fund projects that are aimed at the reinforcement of the 
capacities of the newly elected local councillors. One entry point for this 
are the ‘platforms for democratic dialogue’ that the revised ISSSS plans 
to introduce. These aim to enhance the capacity of local communities to 
shape reforms and hold their leaders accountable. However, for this new 
approach to be successful, it is essential to ensure that such platforms 
have real decision-making power and sustainability.
Strengthening accountability and reconciliation 
Defusing animosities between communities will be difficult without 
addressing accountability for past abuses. It is therefore crucial that 
the Congolese government follows up on the UN Mapping Report. The 
agreed mechanism for this is a mixed legal chamber of international and 
Congolese personnel that would try the gravest human rights violations. 
The Congolese government should also step up its efforts in the domain 
of reconciliation, offering protection to local civil society activists engaged 
in conflict mediation. Hate speech and incitement to violence should be 
prosecuted as crimes, by drafting new legislation if necessary. Here, the 
Framework Agreement, which commits the Congolese government to 
‘further the agenda of reconciliation, tolerance and democratization’, is 
a good start.129
One of the measures currently under consideration by the govern-
ment is the strengthening of the barza communautaire, a community-based 
129 ‘Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and the Region’, 24 February 2013, p. 1.
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forum uniting representatives from different communities. However, 
in the past barzas have become bogged down in internal conflicts while 
their delegates have often been short on legitimacy.130 There is a need to 
go beyond the barza model or transform it to ensure that such platforms 
are representative and cohesive.
Another initiative that could further reconciliation is the provision 
for democratic dialogues within the ISSSS. The activities emerging from 
these dialogues should build upon and link to existing reconciliation and 
mediation initiatives such as the Cadres de concertation inter-communautaire 
(CCI, Platforms for Inter-community Dialogue) in South Kivu’s Fizi 
and Uvira, or the participatory initiatives launched in Kalehe by the 
local NGO Action pour la paix et la concorde (APC, Action for Peace and 
Harmony). These democratic dialogues should also act as a body to shape 
socio-economic projects that are conflict-sensitive and geared towards 
the fostering of social and economic interdependencies between divided 
communities, such as commonly used and managed infrastructure and 
facilities. Such projects could also be used for facilitating the social 
reintegration of former combatants.
Revamping demobilization and reintegration
Poor demobilization and reintegration of former combatants have created 
a large pool of potential recruits that armed groups can easily draw upon. 
Longer-term DDR programmes need to be developed that facilitate 
combatants’ return to civilian life. Future DDR efforts should pay more 
attention to the wider social dynamics of reintegration, including the role 
of former armed group networks and the communities in which combat-
ants are to be reintegrated. To harmonize efforts, potential new DDR 
programmes could be linked to the ISSSS as the democratic dialogue 
element in the ISSSS would allow communities to have an input into 
130 Phil Clark, ‘Ethnicity, Leadership and Conflict Mediation in Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo: The Case of the Barza Inter-Communautaire,’ Journal of Eastern African 
Studies 2 (2008), pp. 1–17.
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the design and implementation of reintegration activities, reducing 
tensions with former combatants. This would only work in the areas 
where ISSSS is implemented, though. Other structures would have to 
be sought elsewhere.
Reforming the army
Army reform has been slow but not non-existent. The achievements and 
the flaws in this area both need to be recognised in order to advance the 
process.
Reinforcing military justice and fighting impunity
The progress made in battling impunity should not be overlooked. 
Between 2008–12, mobile courts in South Kivu were able to carry out 
900 rape trials, with 60 per cent of the accused convicted.131 However, 
the quality of these trials was poor. Research on sexual violence cases 
found that only half the convictions in the sample analysed had sufficient 
evidentiary backing, leading to the conclusion that ‘suspects are likely to 
be convicted, regardless of the evidence presented to sustain the case’.132 
This reflects the dysfunctionality of the Congolese justice system, which 
is characterized by violations of due process, with convictions too often 
reflecting the marginalized position of the convict, rather than his or 
her guilt.
The experience of the internationally backed mobile gender court 
project in South Kivu points to the need for an approach that is focused 
less on rapid, high-profile, and numerous convictions, instead entailing 
greater investment in improving investigative capacity, guaranteeing 
minimum fair trial standards, and raising the standards of evidence. 
Moreover, courts should avoid focusing exclusively on sexual violence, 
131 Michael Maya, ‘Mobile Courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Complemen-
tarity in Action?’ American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, 26 June 2012.
132 Nynke Douma and Dorothea Hilhorst, ‘Fonds de commerce? Sexual Violence 
Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Université de Wageningen, Occasional 
paper n° 2, 2012.
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since that has fed into a commercialization of rape: people in the eastern 
DRC have started to resort to allegations of rape as an income earning 
strategy for extortion or to settle personal scores.133
In general, reinforcing accountability will require a shift from the narrow 
setting of the court system to other areas. These include parliamentary 
oversight and audits of the army, a more powerful Inspector-General 
of the Army with the ability to scrutinize procurement contracts and 
expend itures, and a unit within the military prosecutor’s office specifi-
cally for financial crimes involving army officers.
Shifting from punishment to prevention
Currently, efforts to establish accountability focus on punishment and 
the number of convictions. The focus needs to shift to prevention. Those 
who have been subject to violence, or who have been forced or encour-
aged to inflict violence upon others, are more prone, to perpetrate new 
violent acts. Many FARDC personnel joined the army at a young age, 
frequently after having been a member of an armed group at an even 
younger age. They have thus been exposed to a violent environment for 
large parts of their lives. This area of trauma among FARDC soldiers 
needs to be addressed.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is widely recognized as a 
problem within donor countries’ own armed forces—and consequently 
addressed through comprehensive policies—but it has received little 
attention in the DRC. Initiatives so far are largely taken by army chaplains 
in a limited and scattered manner. Future donor efforts in the DRC 
should take the issue of PTSD seriously.
Strengthening relations between civilians and the military
Improvements in civil-military relations and the integration of civilian 
protection into military operations have been limited. Since 2011, the 
FARDC has had a Permanent Directive on Civil Military Operations 
133 Douma and Hilhorst, ‘Fonds de commerce?’, p. 12.
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(CMO) and the Doctrine on Civil-Military Cooperation was finalized 
in 2013. A number of FARDC staff have received CMO training, among 
others provided by the United States. However, the CMO project has 
faced challenges: only a limited number of CMO officers have been 
deployed and they tend to be marginalized by the military hierarchy and 
lack resources. Future reform efforts should support these initiatives in 
line with the new doctrine, providing CMO personnel with training and 
resources. Furthermore, CMO officers should be included in operational 
planning at headquarters level.
It is important to recognize that apart from top-down CMO initiatives, 
many individual army commanders and units in the field take measures 
to improve relations with the local population. There are many examples 
of army commanders engaged in efforts to ensure the safety of civilians 
and control their troops by imposing curfews and Military Police patrols 
or banning armed troops from circulating in town. Communities have 
developed strategies to cope with a persistent army presence, including 
the active participation of community leaders in local security commit-
tees that bring together civilian and military authorities.
These good practices receive little attention in policy circles. This is 
a missed opportunity, since they can be replicated elsewhere and may 
provide guidance for policy initiatives. Supporting grassroots efforts 
to improve civil-military relations provides an opportunity to create 
positive change, particularly given the slow progress of top-down defence 
reform processes. Such efforts could be extended to support for local 
communities’ attempts to hold commanding officers to account, for the 
organization of training courses for local civilian authorities on how to 
deal with military presence and for joint civil-military activities such as 
joint prayers and football matches.134
134 van Damme and Verweijen, ‘In Search of an Army’, p. 16–36.
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Improving salaries and social conditions
One of the main achievements of the army reform projects backed by 
EUSEC has been the separating of the chain of payments from the chain 
of command. The issuing of biometric ID cards has also reduced the 
embezzlement of salaries. According to one estimate, the biometric 
process has significantly increased the base salary of Congolese soldiers 
by reducing the number of ghost soldiers on the official payroll by over 
220,000 since 2003.135 While loopholes continue to exist, the system is 
an important step towards greater transparency. The payment of salaries 
through bank accounts, a plan that has already been partly implemented, 
will further contribute to this, even if payment will likely remain problem-
atic for soldiers deployed in remote areas.
While the improvement of the regularity of pay is an important 
advance, current salaries remain too low for soldiers not to have to 
engage in private business on the side in order to support their families. 
Although such activities are clearly undesirable, a zero-tolerance policy 
does not seem realistic as long as salary levels remain so low. For this 
reason it might be helpful for the Congolese government to identify and 
regulate economic activity for army personnel, as long as it does not 
undermine local livelihoods or security, or foster conflict in the commu-
nity. One option could be the establishment of agricultural projects 
around military bases, particularly, for the families of soldiers. This has 
yielded positive results in a number of instances.136
Salaries and other income are a key element in army welfare. Rights to 
health care, leave, pensions, and transportation on long-distance rotations 
are also important. And attention should be directed to improving the 
living and safety conditions of the families of soldiers. A new law under 
the Statute of Army Personnel (Loi 13/005 du 15 janvier 2013 portant statut 
135 In 2004, the base salary for a rank-and-file soldier was around USD 10, while today it 
has risen to around USD 70. For the listing of mid-2012, see Marc Mawete, ‘Liste de paye 
des militaires FARDC au front’, Démocratie Chrétienne, 16 June 2012.
136 Désiré Bigega, ‘Nord Kivu: les militaires se nourrissent dans leurs propres champs’, 
Syfia Grands Lacs, 6 April 2012.
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du militaire des FARDC), promulgated in January 2013, heralds impor-
tant improvements in this respect, though it excludes the rank-and-file 
from several of the rights that it awards to officers. For it to enter into 
force a further elaboration and adoption of decrees is necessary. And the 
realloca tion of a substantial amount of funding will be required in order 
for it to be implemented. 
Investing in training and education
Significant progress has been made in terms of training and education: 
the École du génie militaire (Military Engineer Academy) was reopened in 
October 2008, followed by the École de formation des officiers (EFO, Officers 
Academy) in Kananga in October 2011, and the École d’administration 
des FARDC (FARDC Administrative Academy) in September 2012. 
Meanwhile, the École de formation des sous-officiers (Non-Commissioned 
Officers Academy) was opened in Kitona in June 2011. In addition, in the 
course of 2010–11, five special forces battalions were trained by Belgian, 
American and South African officers in Kindu, Kisangani, and Mura. But 
only a small percentage of the troops currently deployed on the front 
lines in the east has so far benefited from these initiatives. There has 
also been a tendency to focus on senior levels, neglecting lower-level 
commanders in companies, platoons, and squads, and trained units have 
frequently been broken up. The inclusion of front-line troops in future 
training schemes, the establishment of a continuous training scheme 
and the preservation of the composition of trained units would all be 
desirable developments.137 
137 Anthony King, ‘The word of command: communication and cohesion in the military’, 
Armed Forces & Society 32/4 (2006): 493–512.
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Glossary of acronyms, words, and phrases
Accord global et inclusif Global and Inclusive Agreement; peace agreement 
signed in December 2002 in
 Pretoria, officially concluding the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (signed in Zambia in 1999) and ending 
the Second Congo War (q.v.)
ADF Allied Democratic Forces
ALEC Alliance pour la libération de l’est du Congo / Alliance 
for the Liberation of East Congo
Amani Leo Peace Today (Swahili); Congolese military 
offensive backed by MONUSCO against the FDLR 
from January 2010 to April 2012; followed the 
Kimia II operations (q.v.)
ANC Armée congolaise nationale / Congolese National 
Army
AFDL Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du 
Congo-Zaïre/ Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire
APCLS Alliance patriotique pour un Congo libre et souverain / 
Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo
Banyamulenge people from Mulenge in the territoire of Uvira, 
South Kivu (plural)
brassage  integration of militias into Congolese army; lit., 
‘brewing’ (Fr.)
chefferie  chiefdom, the highest level of customary 
administration; at level above groupement and 
below territoire (q.v.); chefferies are also included in 
the broader term collectivités
CMO Civil Military Operations 
CNDD-FDD Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces 
de défense de la démocratie / National Council / Forces 
for the Defence of Democracy
CNDP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple / National 
Congress for the Defence of the People
CNL Conseil national de libération / National Liberation 
Council 
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Collectivité administrative entity at level between groupement 
and territoire (q.v.); a collectivité can be a secteur or a 
chefferie
CONADER Commission nationale de désarmement, 
démobilisation et réinsertion / National 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion 
Commission
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAC Forces armées congolaises / Congolese Armed Forces
FALL Forces d’autodéfense locales et légitimes / Local 
Legitimate Self-defence Forces
FARDC Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo / 
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
FAZ Forces armées zaïroises / Zairian Armed Forces
FDIPC Forces pour la défense des intérêts du peuple congolais / 
Forces for the Defence of the Interests of the 
Congolese People
FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du 
Rwanda / Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
FIB United Nations Force Intervention Brigade 
First Congo War War on Congolese soil, pitting the Zairian 
government under President Mobutu against 
the AFDL (q.v.), an armed group backed by an 
alliance between Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and 
Angola. The war ended in April 1997 with the 
toppling of President Mobutu.
FNL Forces nationales de libération / National Liberation 
Forces
FOLC Force oecuménique pour la libération du Congo / 
Ecumenical Force for the Liberation of Congo
Framework Agreement  Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
Region; agreement signed by 11 African states 
and four multinational bodies (UN, AU, EU, 
and SADC) on 24 February 2013, to provide a 
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framework for peace and development in the 
eastern DRC
FRF Forces républicaines fédéralistes / Republican 
Federalist Forces
FRPI Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri / Ituri Patriotic 
Resistance Force
groupement  administrative entity at level between village and 
collectivité (q.v.)
Interahamwe  Those who attack together (Kinyarwanda); a 
Rwandan Hutu paramilitary organization who 
played a central role in the Rwandan genocide  
Kimia II Silence (Swahili); Congolese army offensive 
backed by MONUC (q.v.) against the FDLR (q.v.) 
in 2009; followed the Umoja Wetu operations (q.v.)
M23 Mouvement du 23 mars / March 23 Movement
MAGRIVI Mutuelle des agriculteurs du Virunga / Virunga 
Agricultural Collective
Mai-Mai community-based self-defence militias; from maji, 
‘water’ (Kiswahili)
maquisards  rebel fighters
MPA Mouvement populaire d’autodéfense / Popular Self-
defence Movement
mutuelle ethnically-based urban associations/self-defence 
groups
mwami  king (Kirundi, Kinyarwanda, Nande, Shi and 
several other Bantu languages)
NDC Nduma Defence of Congo 
PARECO Coalition des patriotes résistants congolais / Alliance of 
Resistant Congolese Patriots
PMF Personnel militaire féminin / Female Military 
Personnel
PTSD Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie / 
Congolese Rally for Democracy
RDF Rwandan Defence Force
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
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Second Congo War War on Congolese soil, pitting the government 
in Kinshasa against Rwanda and Uganda and 
their respective allies. Between 1998 and 2003, 
the conflict drew in nine African countries and 
multiple proxy armed groups; it has also been 
referred to as the Great African War.
secteur sector; administrative entity at level between 
groupement and territoire (q.v.); secteurs may also be 
referred to by the broader term collectivités
Simba rebellion lion (Swahili); 1964–7 rebellion against the newly-
independent Congolese government
territoire administrative entity at level between collectivité 
and district
UFRC Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo / Union of 
Revolutionary Forces of Congo
UJPS Union des jeunes patriotes sacrifiés / Union of Young 
Sacrificed Patriots
Umoja Wetu  Our Unity (Swahili); joint Rwandan-Congolese 
offensive against the FDLR (q.v.), January-
February 2009
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accessible information on Congolese 
armed groups. Its studies are, and will be, 
of great use for security sector reform  
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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